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Accessibility office is in limbo as it calls out federal government's failures

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The federal Office of Public Service Accessibility is in limbo months after it produced a document accusing the government of falling behind on supports for public servants with disabilities.
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sarcozona
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What Does “The Builder’s Remedy” Mean for “Abundance?”

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A few months back, Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson released a book in which they described the Abundance Agenda, which Klein summarizes as:

Abundance is the argument that a lot of what is wrong in our society is that we have manufactured scarcities. We have made it too hard to build and create the things people need more of. The places where we focus in the book are housing, clean energy, and state capacity…

But the solutions of one era become the problems of the next. Those procedures became overgrown. So now you have insane outcomes, like laws that are designed to make sure we have a cleaner environment being deployed against the development of solar panels and transmission lines and congestion pricing. Or the fact that in places like California and Washington, DC, it costs a lot more to build affordable housing than to build market-rate housing.

The housing crisis in California is essentially the textbook example of regulations being used to stymie housing (though many other places do it very well too). Which makes this NY Times story about “the buider’s remedy” very interesting (boldface mine):

The law is called the “builder’s remedy,” and it was designed to break the political logjams that have made California one of the most difficult places in the country to build. The law works by nullifying local zoning rules when cities fail to plan for enough housing as required by the state.

While the builder’s remedy has been on the books since 1990, it was effectively dormant until 2022. Since then, however, developers across the state have filed dozens of plans to build 10- and 20-story buildings in neighborhoods where they had never been allowed. Mr. Pustilnikov, who helped pioneer the tactic, has proposed 10 such projects across Los Angeles County….

The irony is that the builder’s remedy was rediscovered almost by accident. Even Ms. Wicks, one of California’s most staunchly pro-housing lawmakers, said the Legislature would never be able to pass the law now because of opposition from local governments. Thus, one of California’s most effective laws for building housing was not a product of its housing emergency or political will, but a legislative relic…

Over more than a dozen tweets, Mr. Elmendorf argued that since 1990, California had had a loophole that allowed developers to bypass the local zoning codes in cities whose housing element was deemed noncompliant by the state. In a follow-up paper, he called it the “builder’s remedy,” a nod to a similar mechanism that arose from New Jersey court rulings that have shaped housing policy in that state.

The clause had rarely been used. But, as it happened, the conditions for exploiting it were historically perfect. Cities across the state were about to be hit with increases in housing target numbers so steep that regulators were all but guaranteed to deem their plans noncompliant.

It’s probably not correct to argue that the builder’s remedy could have been used since 1990, as municipalities’ housing elements might have been deemed compliant back then, but it does seem correct to say that it could have been used since the last plan (roughly ten years, if I understand the timing correctly). What I’m really interested in is what this means for the entire abundance debate.

The example everyone uses for the abundance agenda is the California housing crisis, but the answer, the builder’s remedy, was sitting right there. For years. It suggests that maybe there’s more going on than just too much regulation.

In fact, it seems California is reacting to the builder’s remedy:

Last year, the Legislature passed a bill, introduced by Ms. Wicks, that explicitly codified the builder’s remedy in a modified form: Developers could more easily avail themselves of the tactic in exchange for set limits on density. They cannot build anything they want, but the allowable densities are still several times as large as what local zoning rules allow.

The ultimate impact of the builder’s remedy is likely to be measured not just in units that are built by using it, but in the ones built in fear of it. A few years ago, when Santa Monica was working on its housing element, Jesse Zwick, who was running to be a member of the City Council, sat in frustration while his future colleagues voted for a plan that the state ultimately rejected for failing to provide enough units, he said.

Then developers, including Mr. Pustilnikov, came along, and the wealthy beachfront city was blanketed with housing proposals. The city ended up settling with builders, and the effect is likely to be felt long after.

The fear of builder’s remedy brought along a lot of people whose inclination was to fight everything,” Mr. Zwick said. “They realized it was in our interest to grow and at least be able to have a say in how we do that.”

Anyway, it’s kind of interesting that a stereotypical example of the problem abundance is supposed to address seems to have resolved itself.

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sarcozona
2 hours ago
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Problems with the so-called gender equality paradox

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A few years ago I wrote something on what’s been called the gender equality paradox, a result found in some cross-national studies that “as gender equality increases, so do gender differences.”

My post discussed a particular paper published in that area. It was in the comments section that I laid out my larger concerns with this research:

I do think there’s some incoherence in the arguments I’ve seen presented in this area. Roughly speaking, there are five sorts of country-level variables to look at:

1. Policies and customs: These could include laws on women’s equality, abortion, child support, etc., as well as the prevalence of woman-friendly private-sector policies such as maternity leave and laws that restrict the clothing women can wear in public, etc. Also some measure of the left-right position of the government (although that could go in item 4 below, depending on whether we’re thinking of the government’s political stance as affecting policy or as a measure of the country’s political culture).

2. Health outcomes: Life expectancy is tricky, though. Is equality in life expectancy a sign of equality, or a sign that things are really bad for women, if they don’t have their usual several years advantage compared to men?

3. Sociological and economic outcomes: Labor force participation for men and women, proportions of women going on to higher education, courses of study at university, etc.

4. Social and political attitudes: Opinions of men and women from surveys on attitudes regarding women’s equality, gay rights, abortion, the role of women in the workplace and in politics, etc. There are two ways to summarize this: First, how much do the people in the country support ideals of equality between the sexes; Second, how much do attitudes of men and women differ?

5. Personality surveys: Examples would be the personality inventories used in the study discussed in the above-linked post.

Adding to the mess is that countries change over time, and there are also variables such as the wealth of the country, its geographical location, and its ethnic composition, all of which seem relevant but are not directly captured in any of the measures above.

In any case, if all five of the above sorts of measures were positively correlated, all would be clear: Countries with policies favoring women’s equality have more liberal politics, better health outcomes for women, more social and economic equality in economic outcomes, more support for women’s equality, and smaller differences between men and women in issue attitudes and personality measurements.

But, to the extent these have been studied, it appears that the relevant cross-country correlations are not uniformly positive. For example, the statement provided by Nick in that comment thread, “most nurses are women even in very egalitarian places like Scandinavia,” sounds like evidence in favor of a zero or negative correlation between items 1 and 3 in my list. The statement here that “the countries that minted the most female college graduates in fields like science, engineering, or math were also some of the least gender-equal countries” represents a negative correlation between items 3 and 4, or perhaps within different categories of item 3.

The challenge here is that the five items above can’t all be highly negatively correlated with each other–and, in any case, we wouldn’t expect them to be. Rather, there will be lots of the expected positive correlations, with occasional negative correlations that are newsworthy.

Any negative correlations among the five items above can be taken as a gender-equality paradox.

Even beyond issues of data and measurement, there is a problem of interpretation.

This occurs with just about any study of disparities. From a leftist or liberal perspective, any gender differences can be interpreted as signs of unfairness or discrimination. From a rightist or conservative perspective, any gender differences can be interpreted as reflections of the state of nature.

The same issue arises with cross-national correlations. If gender differences are higher in more gender-equal societies, this can support a leftist view that even the supposedly enlightened western societies still have a ways to go, or it can support a rightist view that in richer societies women have more freedom and so we can see their revealed preference for traditional gender roles. Conversely, if gender differences are lower in more gender-equal societies, this supports a leftist view that more equality leads to progress but also a rightist view that gender equality is an artificial condition arising in the decadent West.

Complicating the matter is that there are several different ways of measuring gender equality and gender differences.

I’m not saying these things shouldn’t be studied; I just think we need to be careful about glib political interpretations of these cross-national comparisons. For example, I don’t trust the argument in this paper:

We found that sex differences in personality, verbal abilities, episodic memory, and negative emotions are more pronounced in countries with higher living conditions. In contrast, sex differences in sexual behavior, partner preferences, and math are smaller in countries with higher living conditions. We also observed that economic indicators of living conditions, such as gross domestic product, are most sensitive in predicting the magnitude of sex differences. Taken together, results indicate that more sex differences are larger, rather than smaller, in countries with higher living conditions. It should therefore be expected that the magnitude of most psychological sex differences will remain unchanged or become more pronounced with improvements in living conditions, such as economy, gender equality, and education.

It just seems like they’re trawling through correlations and then jumping to predictive conclusions about the future.

For awhile I’ve wanted to write more on this topic–basically, something like my above comment with the 5 items etc., but with data.

In the meantime, though, I heard from psychology researcher Mathias Berggren, who seems to have done something about it:

In case you remain interested in the larger subject of the so-called “gender-equality paradox” (GEP); that several measures suggest gender differences are larger in “more gender-equal countries” (Western countries); we have now published a preprint that re-examines multiple previous such results. I think it contains several methodological aspects that could be interesting for further discussion (summarized below).

1. The GEP appears to be an example of how methodologically confounded results have become imbued with meaning over time. Not because these methodological confounds have been overcome (we show they are massive), but because a more intriguing explanation for the results has materialized: the evolutionary idea that more gender-equal societies enable people to follow their innate (gender-specific) preferences.

2. I [Berggren] began looking into this as I found the whole premise of the GEP strange. Basically, it seems to be employed as follows: (a) Researchers think that some gender differences found in the West reflect innate and universal gender differences. (b) They find smaller such differences outside of the West. (c) This is taken as proof that the differences in the West are the truest revelation of such innate and universal gender differences.

3. Indeed, as we show, the predictors that have come to be employed appear to provide nothing beyond just generally pointing towards the West. For example, a simple Western indicator has higher cross-country correlations. As it was already known that gender differences on the most employed measures were larger in the West, these variables thus appear to provide nothing on their own. In the manuscript, we show how easy it is to push some favored theoretical perspective when we know that differences are larger in the West, and just correlate them with some other variables we know have higher scores in the West. Thus, we show that the pattern of gender differences is just as well “explained” by a medical conspiracy, by people’s fear of death, and by novel reading rotting peoples’ brains, as it is explained by the evolutionary interpretation (described in more detail in the supplementary information).

4. The confounds include massive cross-cultural correlations with data quality. This was already shown in the early studies, but the association appears to have become unexamined after more intriguing predictors have been identified. However, we show that it is very strong in all the self-assessment studies we reassess – typically notably stronger than the correlation with gender equality. For an illustration, see Figure 3 in the manuscript.
That figure also contains a barplot of answers to a patience staircase item – with the largest floor effects I’ve ever seen. That item originates from an article published in Science, but whose open-source data only included scale scores rather than item scores – which we needed to assess scale reliability. Reaching out about this also did not result in sharing of the item scores. Thus, we had to separate item scores ourselves where we could do so. The method we employed is described the supplementary information. Some special factors made it possible in this case, but the method might be of interest to data miners who want to reassess results where item scores are not directly available.

I replied that yes, I remain interested in the topic, not so much because I think there’s a GEP but because it’s interesting to me that so many people seem to want the GEP to be true.

Berggren responded:

I think there are three reasons why the GEP has become popular:

1. It seems to provide proof for essentialist views of men and women.

2. It provides cover for any gender differences in the West. By the logic of the GEP, when the West has largest (measured) gender differences on some dimension, this is proof that those differences develop freely and naturally. Thus, either differences are larger elsewhere, and then the West has come further in adressing such unfair cultural norms; or differences are largest in the West, and then they are just natural and inevitable.

3. It provides cover for cultural/methdological confounds in cross-cultural comparisons, and gives the sense that “all is well” with the data, and that nothing needs to be adressed. If there is a theoretical explanation for the results, then one can just lean into that explanation and keep working as usual. But if results are are due to confounds, then one has to think further about how to adress those issues. As we note in the preprint, there were multiple considerations of confounds in the early studies. However, after the introduction of the evolutionary interpretation of the GEP, the focus appears to have shifted.

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sarcozona
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Augie Ray (@augieray@mastodon.social)

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sarcozona
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Part 1: My Life Is a Lie - by Michael W. Green

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We’re going to largely skip markets again, because the sweater is rapidly unraveling in other areas as I pull on threads. Suffice it to say that the market is LARGELY unfolding as I had expected — credit stress is rising, particularly in the tech sector. Many are now pointing to the rising CDS for Oracle as the deterioration in “AI” balance sheets accelerates. CDS was also JUST introduced for META — it traded at 56, slightly worse than the aggregate IG CDS at 54.5 (itself up from 46 since I began discussing this topic):

Correlations are spiking as MOST stocks move in the same direction each day even as megacap tech continues to define the market aggregates:

Market pricing of correlation is beginning to pick up… remember this is the “real” fear index and the moving averages are trending upwards:

And, as I predicted, inflation concerns, notably absent from any market-based indication, are again freezing the Fed. The pilots are frozen, understanding that they are in Zugzwang — every choice has unfavorable options.

And so now, let’s tug on that loose thread… I’m sure many of my left-leaning readers will say, “This is obvious, we have been talking about it for YEARS!” Yes, many of you have; but you were using language of emotion (“Pay a living wage!”) rather than showing the math. My bad for not paying closer attention; your bad for not showing your work or coming up with workable solutions. Let’s rectify it rather than cast blame.

I have spent my career distrusting the obvious.

Markets, liquidity, factor models—none of these ever felt self-evident to me. Markets are mechanisms of price clearing. Mechanisms have parameters. Parameters distort outcomes. This is the lens through which I learned to see everything: find the parameter, find the distortion, find the opportunity.

But there was one number I had somehow never interrogated. One number that I simply accepted, the way a child accepts gravity.

The poverty line.

I don’t know why. It seemed apolitical, an actuarial fact calculated by serious people in government offices. A line someone else drew decades ago that we use to define who is “poor,” who is “middle class,” and who deserves help. It was infrastructure—invisible, unquestioned, foundational.

This week, while trying to understand why the American middle class feels poorer each year despite healthy GDP growth and low unemployment, I came across a sentence buried in a research paper:

“The U.S. poverty line is calculated as three times the cost of a minimum food diet in 1963, adjusted for inflation.”

I read it again. Three times the minimum food budget.

I felt sick.

The formula was developed by Mollie Orshansky, an economist at the Social Security Administration. In 1963, she observed that families spent roughly one-third of their income on groceries. Since pricing data was hard to come by for many items, e.g. housing, if you could calculate a minimum adequate food budget at the grocery store, you could multiply by three and establish a poverty line.

Orshansky was careful about what she was measuring. In her January 1965 article, she presented the poverty thresholds as a measure of income inadequacy, not income adequacy—”if it is not possible to state unequivocally ‘how much is enough,’ it should be possible to assert with confidence how much, on average, is too little.”

She was drawing a floor. A line below which families were clearly in crisis.

For 1963, that floor made sense. Housing was relatively cheap. A family could rent a decent apartment or buy a home on a single income, as we’ve discussed. Healthcare was provided by employers and cost relatively little (Blue Cross coverage averaged $10/month). Childcare didn’t really exist as a market—mothers stayed home, family helped, or neighbors (who likely had someone home) watched each other’s kids. Cars were affordable, if prone to breakdowns. With few luxury frills, the neighborhood kids in vo-tech could fix most problems when they did. College tuition could be covered with a summer job. Retirement meant a pension income, not a pile of 401(k) assets you had to fund yourself.

Orshansky’s food-times-three formula was crude, but as a crisis threshold—a measure of “too little”—it roughly corresponded to reality. A family spending one-third of its income on food would spend the other two-thirds on everything else, and those proportions more or less worked. Below that line, you were in genuine crisis. Above it, you had a fighting chance.

But everything changed between 1963 and 2024.

Housing costs exploded. Healthcare became the largest household expense for many families. Employer coverage shrank while deductibles grew. Childcare became a market, and that market became ruinously expensive. College went from affordable to crippling. Transportation costs rose as cities sprawled and public transit withered under government neglect.

The labor model shifted. A second income became mandatory to maintain the standard of living that one income formerly provided. But a second income meant childcare became mandatory, which meant two cars became mandatory. Or maybe you’d simply be “asking for a lot generationally speaking” because living near your parents helps to defray those childcare costs.

The composition of household spending transformed completely. In 2024, food-at-home is no longer 33% of household spending. For most families, it’s 5 to 7 percent.

Housing now consumes 35 to 45 percent. Healthcare takes 15 to 25 percent. Childcare, for families with young children, can eat 20 to 40 percent.

If you keep Orshansky’s logic—if you maintain her principle that poverty could be defined by the inverse of food’s budget share—but update the food share to reflect today’s reality, the multiplier is no longer three.

It becomes sixteen.

Which means if you measured income inadequacy today the way Orshansky measured it in 1963, the threshold for a family of four wouldn’t be $31,200.

It would be somewhere between $130,000 and $150,000.

And remember: Orshansky was only trying to define “too little.” She was identifying crisis, not sufficiency. If the crisis threshold—the floor below which families cannot function—is honestly updated to current spending patterns, it lands at $140,000.

What does that tell you about the $31,200 line we still use?

It tells you we are measuring starvation.

“An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics.” — Plutarch

The official poverty line for a family of four in 2024 is $31,200. The median household income is roughly $80,000. We have been told, implicitly, that a family earning $80,000 is doing fine—safely above poverty, solidly middle class, perhaps comfortable.

But if Orshansky’s crisis threshold were calculated today using her own methodology, that $80,000 family would be living in deep poverty.

I wanted to see what would happen if I ignored the official stats and simply calculated the cost of existing. I built a Basic Needs budget for a family of four (two earners, two kids). No vacations, no Netflix, no luxury. Just the “Participation Tickets” required to hold a job and raise kids in 2024.

Using conservative, national-average data:

Childcare: $32,773

Housing: $23,267

Food: $14,717

Transportation: $14,828

Healthcare: $10,567

Other essentials: $21,857

Required net income: $118,009

Add federal, state, and FICA taxes of roughly $18,500, and you arrive at a required gross income of $136,500.

This is Orshansky’s “too little” threshold, updated honestly. This is the floor.

The single largest line item isn’t housing. It’s childcare: $32,773.

This is the trap. To reach the median household income of $80,000, most families require two earners. But the moment you add the second earner to chase that income, you trigger the childcare expense.

If one parent stays home, the income drops to $40,000 or $50,000—well below what’s needed to survive. If both parents work to hit $100,000, they hand over $32,000 to a daycare center.

The second earner isn’t working for a vacation or a boat. The second earner is working to pay the stranger watching their children so they can go to work and clear $1-2K extra a month. It’s a closed loop.

Critics will immediately argue that I’m cherry-picking expensive cities. They will say $136,500 is a number for San Francisco or Manhattan, not “Real America.”

So let’s look at “Real America.”

The model above allocates $23,267 per year for housing. That breaks down to $1,938 per month. This is the number that serious economists use to tell you that you’re doing fine.

In my last piece, Are You An American?, I analyzed a modest “starter home” which turned out to be in Caldwell, New Jersey—the kind of place a Teamster could afford in 1955. I went to Zillow to see what it costs to live in that same town if you don’t have a down payment and are forced to rent.

There are exactly seven 2-bedroom+ units available in the entire town. The cheapest one rents for $2,715 per month.

That’s a $777 monthly gap between the model and reality. That’s $9,300 a year in post-tax money. To cover that gap, you need to earn an additional $12,000 to $13,000 in gross salary.

So when I say the real poverty line is $140,000, I’m being conservative. I’m using optimistic, national-average housing assumptions. If we plug in the actual cost of living in the zip codes where the jobs are—where rent is $2,700, not $1,900—the threshold pushes past $160,000.

The market isn’t just expensive; it’s broken. Seven units available in a town of thousands? That isn’t a market. That’s a shortage masquerading as an auction.

And that $2,715 rent check buys you zero equity. In the 1950s, the monthly housing cost was a forced savings account that built generational wealth. Today, it’s a subscription fee for a roof. You are paying a premium to stand still.

Economists will look at my $140,000 figure and scream about “hedonic adjustments.” Heck, I will scream at you about them. They are valid attempts to measure the improvement in quality that we honestly value.

I will tell you that comparing 1955 to 2024 is unfair because cars today have airbags, homes have air conditioning, and phones are supercomputers. I will argue that because the quality of the good improved, the real price dropped.

And I would be making a category error. We are not calculating the price of luxury. We are calculating the price of participation.

To function in 1955 society—to have a job, call a doctor, and be a citizen—you needed a telephone line. That “Participation Ticket” cost $5 a month.

Adjusted for standard inflation, that $5 should be $58 today.

But you cannot run a household in 2024 on a $58 landline. To function today—to factor authenticate your bank account, to answer work emails, to check your child’s school portal (which is now digital-only)—you need a smartphone plan and home broadband.

The cost of that “Participation Ticket” for a family of four is not $58. It’s $200 a month.

The economists say, “But look at the computing power you get!”

I say, “Look at the computing power I need!”

The utility I’m buying is “connection to the economy.” The price of that utility didn’t just keep pace with inflation; it tripled relative to it.

I ran this “Participation Audit” across the entire 1955 budget. I didn’t ask “is the car better?” I asked “what does it cost to get to work?”

Healthcare: In 1955, Blue Cross family coverage was roughly $10/month ($115 in today’s dollars). Today, the average family premium is over $1,600/month. That’s 14x inflation.

Taxes (FICA): In 1955, the Social Security tax was 2.0% on the first $4,200 of income. The maximum annual contribution was $84. Adjusted for inflation, that’s about $960 a year. Today, a family earning the median $80,000 pays over $6,100. That’s 6x inflation.

Childcare: In 1955, this cost was zero because the economy supported a single-earner model. Today, it’s $32,000. That’s an infinite increase in the cost of participation.

The only thing that actually tracked official CPI was… food. Everything else—the inescapable fees required to hold a job, stay healthy, and raise children—inflated at multiples of the official rate when considered on a participation basis. YES, these goods and services are BETTER. I would not trade my 65” 4K TV mounted flat on the wall for a 25” CRT dominating my living room; but I don’t have a choice, either.

Once I established that $136,500 is the real break-even point, I ran the numbers on what happens to a family climbing the ladder toward that number.

What I found explains the “vibes” of the economy better than any CPI print.

Our entire safety net is designed to catch people at the very bottom, but it sets a trap for anyone trying to climb out. As income rises from $40,000 to $100,000, benefits disappear faster than wages increase.

I call this The Valley of Death.

Let’s look at the transition for a family in New Jersey:

1. The View from $35,000 (The “Official” Poor)

At this income, the family is struggling, but the state provides a floor. They qualify for Medicaid (free healthcare). They receive SNAP (food stamps). They receive heavy childcare subsidies. Their deficits are real, but capped.

2. The Cliff at $45,000 (The Healthcare Trap)

The family earns a $10,000 raise. Good news? No. At this level, the parents lose Medicaid eligibility. Suddenly, they must pay premiums and deductibles.

  • Income Gain: +$10,000

  • Expense Increase: +$10,567

  • Net Result: They are poorer than before. The effective tax on this mobility is over 100%.

3. The Cliff at $65,000 (The Childcare Trap)

This is the breaker. The family works harder. They get promoted to $65,000. They are now solidly “Working Class.”

But at roughly this level, childcare subsidies vanish. They must now pay the full market rate for daycare.

  • Income Gain: +$20,000 (from $45k)

  • Expense Increase: +$28,000 (jumping from co-pays to full tuition)

  • Net Result: Total collapse.

When you run the net-income numbers, a family earning $100,000 is effectively in a worse monthly financial position than a family earning $40,000.

At $40,000, you are drowning, but the state gives you a life vest. At $100,000, you are drowning, but the state says you are a “high earner” and ties an anchor to your ankle called “Market Price.”

In option terms, the government has sold a call option to the poor, but they’ve rigged the gamma. As you move “closer to the money” (self-sufficiency), the delta collapses. For every dollar of effort you put in, the system confiscates 70 to 100 cents.

No rational trader would take that trade. Yet we wonder why labor force participation lags. It’s not a mystery. It’s math.

The most dangerous lie of modern economics is “Mean Reversion.” Economists assume that if a family falls into debt or bankruptcy, they can simply save their way back to the average.

They are confusing Volatility with Ruin.

Falling below the line isn’t like cooling water; it’s like freezing it. It is a Phase Change.

When a family hits the barrier—eviction, bankruptcy, or default—they don’t just have “less money.” They become Economically Inert.

  • They are barred from the credit system (often for 7–10 years).

  • They are barred from the prime rental market (landlord screens).

  • They are barred from employment in sensitive sectors.

In physics, it takes massive “Latent Heat” to turn ice back into water. In economics, the energy required to reverse a bankruptcy is exponentially higher than the energy required to pay a bill.

The $140,000 line matters because it is the buffer against this Phase Change. If you are earning $80,000 with $79,000 in fixed costs, you are not stable. You are super-cooled water. One shock—a transmission failure, a broken arm—and you freeze instantly.

If you need proof that the cost of participating, the cost of working, is the primary driver of this fragility, look at the Covid lockdowns.

In April 2020, the US personal savings rate hit a historic 33%. Economists attributed this to stimulus checks. But the math tells a different story.

During lockdown, the “Valley of Death” was temporarily filled.

  • Childcare ($32k): Suspended. Kids were home.

  • Commuting ($15k): Suspended.

  • Work Lunches/Clothes ($5k): Suspended.

For a median family, the “Cost of Participation” in the economy is roughly $50,000 a year. When the economy stopped, that tax was repealed. Families earning $80,000 suddenly felt rich—not because they earned more, but because the leak in the bucket was plugged. For many, income actually rose thanks to the $600/week unemployment boost. But even for those whose income stayed flat, they felt rich because many costs were avoided.

When the world reopened, the costs returned, but now inflated by 20%. The rage we feel today is the hangover from that brief moment where the American Option was momentarily back in the money. Those with formal training in economics have dismissed these concerns, by and large. “Inflation” is the rate of change in the price level; these poor, deluded souls were outraged at the price LEVEL. Tut, tut… can’t have deflation now, can we? We promise you will like THAT even less.

But the price level does mean something, too. If you are below the ACTUAL poverty line, you are suffering constant deprivation; and a higher price level means you get even less in aggregate.

You load sixteen tons, what do you get?
Another day older and deeper in debt
Saint Peter, don’t you call me, ‘cause I can’t go
I owe my soul to the company store — Merle Travis, 1946

This mathematical valley explains the rage we see in the American electorate, specifically the animosity the “working poor” (the middle class) feel toward the “actual poor” and immigrants.

Economists and politicians look at this anger and call it racism, or lack of empathy. They are missing the mechanism.

Altruism is a function of surplus. It is easy to be charitable when you have excess capacity. It is impossible to be charitable when you are fighting for the last bruised banana.

The family earning $65,000—the family that just lost their subsidies and is paying $32,000 for daycare and $12,000 for healthcare deductibles—is hyper-aware of the family earning $30,000 and getting subsidized food, rent, childcare, and healthcare.

They see the neighbor at the grocery store using an EBT card while they put items back on the shelf. They see the immigrant family receiving emergency housing support while they face eviction.

They are not seeing “poverty.” They are seeing people getting for free the exact things that they are working 60 hours a week to barely afford. And even worse, even if THEY don’t see these things first hand… they are being shown them:

The anger isn’t about the goods. It’s about the breach of contract. The American Deal was that Effort ~ Security. Effort brought your Hope strike closer. But because the real poverty line is $140,000, effort no longer yields security or progress; it brings risk, exhaustion, and debt.

When you are drowning, and you see the lifeguard throw a life vest to the person treading water next to you—a person who isn’t swimming as hard as you are—you don’t feel happiness for them. You feel a homicidal rage at the lifeguard.

We have created a system where the only way to survive is to be destitute enough to qualify for aid, or rich enough to ignore the cost. Everyone in the middle is being cannibalized. The rich know this… and they are increasingly opting out of the shared spaces:

If you need visual proof of this benchmark error, look at the charts that economists love to share on social media to prove that “vibes” are wrong and the economy is great.

You’ve likely seen this chart. It shows that the American middle class is shrinking not because people are getting poorer, but because they’re “moving up” into the $150,000+ bracket.

The economists look at this and cheer. “Look!” they say. “In 1967, only 5% of families made over $150,000 (adjusted for inflation). Now, 34% do! We are a nation of rising aristocrats.”

But look at that chart through the lens of the real poverty line.

If the cost of basic self-sufficiency for a family of four—housing, childcare, healthcare, transportation—is $140,000, then that top light-blue tier isn’t “Upper Class.”

It’s the Survival Line.

This chart doesn’t show that 34% of Americans are rich. It shows that only 34% of Americans have managed to escape deprivation. It shows that the “Middle Class” (the dark blue section between $50,000 and $150,000)—roughly 45% of the country—is actually the Working Poor. These are the families earning enough to lose their benefits but not enough to pay for childcare and rent. They are the ones trapped in the Valley of Death.

But the commentary tells us something different:

“Americans earned more for several reasons. The first is that neoliberal economic policies worked as intended. In the last 50 years, there have been big increases in productivity, solid GDP growth and, since the 1980s, low and predictable inflation. All this helped make most Americans richer.”

neoliberal economic policies worked as intended” — read that again. With POSIWID (the purpose of a system is what it does) in mind.

The chart isn’t measuring prosperity. It’s measuring inflation in the non-discretionary basket. It tells us that to live a 1967 middle-class life in 2024, you need a “wealthy” income.

And then there’s this chart, the shield used by every defender of the status quo:

Poverty has collapsed to 11%. The policies worked as intended!

But remember Mollie Orshansky. This chart is measuring the percentage of Americans who cannot afford a minimum food diet multiplied by three.

It’s not measuring who can afford rent (which is up 4x relative to wages). It’s not measuring who can afford childcare (which is up infinite percent). It’s measuring starvation.

Of course the line is going down. We are an agricultural superpower who opened our markets to even cheaper foreign food. Shrimp from Vietnam, tilapia from… don’t ask. Food is cheap. But life is expensive.

When you see these charts, don’t let them gaslight you. They are using broken rulers to measure a broken house. The top chart proves that you need $150,000 to make it. The bottom chart proves they refuse to admit it.

So that’s the trap. The real poverty line—the threshold where a family can afford housing, healthcare, childcare, and transportation without relying on means-tested benefits—isn’t $31,200.

It’s ~$140,000.

Most of my readers will have cleared this threshold. My parents never really did, but I was born lucky — brains, beauty (in the eye of the beholder admittedly), height (it really does help), parents that encouraged and sacrificed for education (even as the stress of those sacrifices eventually drove my mother clinically insane), and an American citizenship. But most of my readers are now seeing this trap for their children.

And the system is designed to prevent them from escaping. Every dollar you earn climbing from $40,000 to $100,000 triggers benefit losses that exceed your income gains. You are literally poorer for working harder.

The economists will tell you this is fine because you’re building wealth. Your 401(k) is growing. Your home equity is rising. You’re richer than you feel.

Next week, I’ll show you why that’s wrong. And THEN we can start the discussion of how to rebuild. Because we can.

The wealth you’re counting on—the retirement accounts, the home equity, the “nest egg” that’s supposed to make this all worthwhile—is just as fake as the poverty line. But the humans behind that wealth are real. And they are amazing.

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sarcozona
1 day ago
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“if you measured income inadequacy today the way Orshansky measured it in 1963, the threshold for a family of four wouldn’t be $31,200.

It would be somewhere between $130,000 and $150,000.”
Epiphyte City
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The Anglo-Australian drift

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sarcozona
3 days ago
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“Australia has a foreign-born population of 31 per cent (that is not a misprint) but one of the smaller populist uprisings in the democratic west.”
Epiphyte City
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