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The Myth of the Police State — The Dial

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There’s a little town in the scrub in South Africa — a full day’s drive from the country’s big cities — that has become perhaps the most scrutinized place on earth given its size. It is 3.5 square miles of suburban-style houses harboring about 3,000 people, a main drag, a municipal swimming pool, one gas station, and some small pecan farms. Nothing of consequence ever really happens there, a fact the townspeople take as a point of pride. And yet over the past three decades, dozens of English-language news outlets have made a pilgrimage to it, often more than once. The New York Times alone has run four long dedicated profiles. The essays have kept pace year after year, quoting the same people over and over, even as nothing of note occurred. There’s been no war, no disaster.

That changelessness is the point. No people of color are allowed to live in the town, called Orania. The name is a nod to the river that runs nearby — and to the Orange Free State, the apartheid-era designation for the province in which it lies. Orania’s founders established it in 1991, the year after South Africa’s best-known Black liberation leader (and future president), Nelson Mandela, was freed following 27 years in prison.

Understanding that Mandela’s liberation meant that white-minority rule was coming to an end, the founders trekked into the desert, bought a disused mining town wholesale, and established a colony. Laws permitting — indeed, mandating — spatial segregation by race had just been abolished in the country, so they declared the town private property. In their publicity for the settlement, Orania’s founders said they wanted to keep the town segregated to run an experiment: Could people of European descent manage to live in South Africa without relying on people of color to do manual labor, pump their gas, and clean their houses? In Orania, they stressed, white residents would do such work.

They also foresaw a brutal race war and an apocalypse for South Africa’s white citizens, predicting that the population of Orania itself would soon grow to 10,000 residents and its ideals would spread across an entire nearby province, drawing in hundreds of thousands. Statues of former white leaders watch over the town. A small museum displays fishing trophies won by the so-called architect of apartheid, former prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd, and a bust labeling him a “man of destiny.”

I’ve lived in South Africa for 16 years, ever since I left the United States in 2009. And I, too, dutifully traveled out to Orania for the evidently obligatory journalist’s visit a few weeks after I landed there. But in the ensuing years, I began to wonder why the town was a source of such stubborn fascination abroad. In the beginning, the U.S. and European reporters that descended on the town mostly hailed from mainstream or left-wing outlets, and they seemed to buy its claims about its widespread appeal, insisting that it was steadily attracting more and more revanchist white residents. At first I thought these reporters might have been comforting themselves: Our societies may have failed to address persistent racial injustice, but look at white South Africans, longing to return to outright segregation! At least we’re not that backward.

But more lately, the fascination with Orania has spread to the right wing outside South Africa. Starting in the mid-2010s, as Donald Trump was muscling his way onto the political stage, Australian, European, and, especially, American conservative commentators began to talk about the town. They, too, portrayed it as thriving — because of the enormous threat they claimed white people faced in the rest of South Africa. In these years — during which a Black man was president of the United States, demographers began to predict a “majority-minority” America, and the Black Lives Matter movement arose — it seemed as if a big shift was happening. Not only would so-called minorities seek legal equality in white-led societies but they also would take greater ownership of politics and the national story. White Americans worried about this transition didn’t need to provide proof because their anxiety was largely putative: If this trend continues, we will be victimized.

So they latched on to South Africa as a supposed natural experiment. After the country became a one-man, one-vote democracy, people of color took the reins of politics, came to dominate TV news and op-ed columns, climbed the ranks of business, and refashioned school curricula to narrate a different national history. Conservative bloggers, talk-radio hosts, and cable networks invited a small and vocal contingent of white South Africans — sometimes people associated with Orania, sometimes representatives of lobby groups for Afrikaner interests — to bear witness to a specific version of this transition. Although it may have been immoral, these South Africans’ story went, white-minority rule had created safe, stable, and happy lives for white people. After losing influence, white South Africans became increasingly subject to discrimination, hate, violence, and even a so-called white genocide by citizens of color bent on pursuing revenge.

The world that Trump and his acolytes have said they want to build, in fact, bears many striking resemblances to the unbearable policing that happened under apartheid. But the message from the vast majority of South Africans to people in the United States is: You won’t like it.

The cautionary tale was this: If formerly oppressed people got enough power, they would inevitably pursue violent retribution — even an annihilation program. That provided a justification for other white leaders’ efforts to retain their cultural influence. When Donald Trump reentered the White House in January 2025, his supporters’ fixation on South Africa grew exponentially as he became more willing to put policy behind his rhetoric. He’d tweeted about white South Africans’ victimization during his first term, but in the first six months of his second term, Trump promulgated an unprecedented executive order targeting the country. It cut U.S. foreign assistance and made a startling exception to his general antipathy to immigrants by offering expedited refugee status to Afrikaners, the Dutch-descended white group that helped build the apartheid regime. In May, he brought South African president Cyril Ramaphosa to the White House for a kind of kangaroo trial, declaring that he felt there was “persecution or genocide going on.” Taking the hint from Trump, nearly every big-league conservative influencer in the United States — Ben Shapiro, Dave Rubin, Tucker Carlson, Matt Gaetz — invited white South Africans to discuss the issue; sometimes these shows touted Orania as the only safe space left for them.

The problem is that the tale peddled about white South Africans’ historical trajectory isn’t true. They are not, as a group, subject to violent persecution on the basis of their skin color. Thirty years after white rule ended, white households’ average income remains four times that of Black households. Although South Africa’s devastatingly high crime rate victimizes all the country’s inhabitants, white South Africans are overall less likely than Black citizens to be crime’s victims. And to many white South Africans, the warped way their country is depicted abroad isn’t even the most important distortion. Spend some real time speaking to the estimated 4.5 million white people who still live in South Africa — a number that has remained steady since the late 1980s — and most will tell you that they are better off now than they were under the white regime that was purportedly designed to protect them. Violent crime has fallen by nearly half since its peak in 1993. The rule of law largely operates, elections are free and fair, and white politicians hold major cabinet ministries.

Why are people who live in white-majority countries so uninterested in the real story, even unwilling to believe it? It isn’t only right-wingers who believe that racial hatred can never disappear and will inevitably reassert itself in some form. I felt that the left-wing reporters who flocked to Orania were searching for evidence to feed a form of the same conviction: that white people will never give up the sense of superiority that drove them to impose racial segregation. That people want to live with their own and will push those unlike them to the margins of their societies, or out of them altogether. That wielding raw power over another group is terribly alluring, that the desire for it is so baked into human nature that efforts to trade it for equity and diversity will probably fail. This idea now passes for sophisticated thinking, even among self-identified progressives who wish for a more just and equitable world but often seem to have given up on it.

This loss of faith is sad, because the real South African story has a different lesson. What is often overlooked in the American fascination with South Africa is the violence the apartheid regime wrought on white people. They were not its main or intended victims; they were supposed to be its beneficiaries. But the apartheid regime became a police state that heavily circumscribed its white citizens’ lives, too. School curriculums were sanitized; the press was cowed. White teenagers were drafted into a brutal military that was perpetually mobilized to fight.

The world that Trump and his acolytes have said they want to build, in fact, bears many striking resemblances to the unbearable policing that happened under apartheid. But the message from the vast majority of South Africans to people in the United States is: You won’t like it.

Ever since Europeans began to settle the southern tip of Africa, they sought to segregate the native populations. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India’s colony at Cape Town subjected indigenous people who hoped to trade with their soldiers, sailors, and farmers to different rules and planted thorn bushes to keep them out of the European settlement. Starting in the early 1900s, the South African government, by then a British imperial colony, began to institute formal laws restricting Black and mixed-race people, as well as inhabitants of Indian descent originally brought over as slaves, from living freely in 87 percent of the country’s territory and curbing their right to work so that they wouldn’t compete with white citizens. In 1948, an Afrikaner political party seized control from English-speaking white South Africans and began two parallel projects: to become independent from British rule and to further deepen and formalize “apartheid,” which in Afrikaans means “separateness.”

The apartheid state was a police state. Free speech was tremendously proscribed.

To maintain white people’s political and economic power, the Afrikaner government drew overt inspiration from Jim Crow, sending emissaries to the American South to study its “separate but equal” schools, buses, and water fountains. Apartheid’s so-called architect, Hendrik Verwoerd, was an authoritarian conservative. According to his biographer, he had a “dominating personality” and “those who came under his influence found him irresistible.”

Trained as a psychologist, Verwoerd justified apartheid, which created sprawling, geographically incongruent “native reserves” and condemned Black people to manual jobs in white neighborhoods, by maintaining that multiracial communities were, by definition, a recipe for “the most terrific clash of interests imaginable. The endeavors and desires of the Bantu [Black people] and the endeavors and objectives of all Europeans [white people] will be antagonistic. Such a clash can only bring unhappiness and misery to both.” He added that “resentment and revenge” would be the inevitable outcome of including Black South Africans in the country’s politics: “The people of South Africa cannot accept the consequence of a multi-racial state unless the Whites . . . are prepared to commit race suicide.”

The incredibly tightly regulated segregationist system that Verwoerd established victimized people of color the most. They could not own businesses, participate in national politics, or even walk in “white” neighborhoods without a “pass” signed by their employer. Taking “separate but equal” to a cruel extreme, the government insisted that Black-dominated –and less agriculturally fertile — regions of South Africa were separate countries; although no other country ever recognized these “bantustans” as independent nations, Black South Africans were required to get separate passports and many who lived in urban areas were forced back to so-called tribal homelands they had never set foot in.

But apartheid brought immense unhappiness and misery to white South Africans, too. The apartheid state was a police state. Free speech was tremendously proscribed. As the 1950s rolled into the 1960s, more and more African countries were freeing themselves from European colonial domination; this wave of liberation prompted the emergence of liberation movements in South Africa and anti-apartheid protests. At such protests, white policemen often famously saved their worst acts of brutality for the few white demonstrators. White newspaper editors were routinely imprisoned or forced to become police informants. Top government, military, and intelligence officials pressured and harassed newsrooms, even walking through them unannounced. In 1990, when one Afrikaans-language newspaper became too critical of the government, a defense ministry operative bombed its offices. The state routinely seized the passports of thousands of white politicians, journalists, artists, and students.

In 1960, the country’s most famous novelist, Alan Paton, the author of Cry, the Beloved Country, had his passport seized, forcing a choice: remain permanently trapped in South Africa, hobbling his ability to build a serious literary career, or be stripped of his citizenship and become a stateless person. A few months after Trump reentered the White House, Tucker Carlson dwelled on the idea that Black South Africans may, like Hutu leaders during Rwanda’s genocide, come to see white people as vermin. This was a hypothetical. But the apartheid government actually did see white citizens who didn’t toe the line that way. John Vorster, who served as South Africa’s prime minister from 1966 to 1978, famously explained the government’s philosophy: When a fly is troubling you, you either swat it or let it fly out the window.

Psychiatrists employed by the state used bureaucratic interactions like the military draft to hunt for people who might be gay. Those who came under suspicion were taken unwillingly to a military hospital in Pretoria, cut off from their families, and subjected to electric shocks. Nearly a thousand men and women whose behavior failed to “correct” itself were subjected to forced sex-reassignment surgery.

But the system didn’t target only white people who dissented from a norm. It kept the vast majority of white South Africans fearful and uncertain and gave them little room to maneuver. Television was banned altogether until 1975. A harsh censorship regime — you couldn’t buy a copy of Das Kapital in the country, and the radio couldn’t play Bob Dylan — kept white citizens artificially ignorant, relatively unaware of events both inside and outside their country. (In 1986, a U.S. News & World Report journalist wrote that during an interview with a white construction worker — who was “holding a copy of a leading Johannesburg newspaper” — the interviewee eagerly asked him for real news: “What’s really going on in this country?”) When my husband, a white South African, traveled to Germany as a teen in late 1989, he didn’t even realize the mysterious dismantling of structures in the middle of Berlin was the fall of the Berlin Wall: The bureaucrats who ran South Africa’s public schools, worried that white children would learn that dissent was possible, did not put the wall in the curriculum, nor even the broader European opposition to communism.

The government harshly policed interracial relationships. In 1972 alone, more than five hundred people were prosecuted under the Immorality Act, which forbade sex across the color line. White families nonetheless “had enormous proximity to Black people, particularly in the domestic realm,” David Bruce, a sixty-two-year-old white South African criminologist, told me. This led organically to feelings of love for one’s Black nannies and friendship with the children of your Black live-in maids, but this warmth had to be suppressed. “There was a deeply authoritarian mentality.”

It is sometimes said that white South Africans were, at least, insulated from apartheid’s physical violence. That is not true. In 1978, then prime minister P.W. Botha famously defined the white South African condition as a perpetual battle against “a psychological onslaught, an economic one, a military one, a diplomatic one — a total onslaught” by Black “terrorists.” That concept caused many white people’s lives to be pervaded by both actual violence and the fear of it. In school, white children learned to handle semiautomatic weapons to, in the words of the South African military’s magazine, instill an “awareness among schoolboys of the nature of the onslaught” by “malevolent revolutionary forces.” An abiding fear of the swart gevaar, or the “Black danger,” was drilled into them. Amos van der Westhuizen is a fifty-six-year-old financial adviser whose father was an official in the National Party, the political party that instituted apartheid. He told me that this sense of onslaught made childhood constrained and scary. In a memoir, Kat in die Honderhoek (Cat in the henhouse), he remembered a time when a gust of wind broke a window at his school. “They” — Black people — “are on us!” he and the other white boys thought, panicked. Van der Westhuizen loved to play cricket and rugby, but the segregationist apartheid regime stunted that dream by restricting him from testing his mettle with talented Black athletes. The government disallowed even elite white sportspeople from playing with Black sportspeople, which meant the white athletes could rarely compete abroad.

Van der Westhuizen and his friends could mainly look forward to joining the military. Just a few years after the apartheid regime was instituted, South Africa established mandatory conscription for every white teenage male, and in the mid-1970s the country went to war with multiple neighboring countries. If draftees declined to serve, they could be imprisoned. The army was callous: By the mid-1980s, hundreds of conscripts were attempting suicide every year. Angela McIntyre, a historian of the Angolan civil war and South Africa’s intervention into it, told me many white South Africans “were press-ganged into something they were forbidden from understanding.”

Mark Joseph, a fifty-two-year-old mental health and mindfulness educator born in Johannesburg, told me that as a teen, he’d bought into the apartheid state’s claims that Black people “were our enemy, were going to kill us all, and have no respect for life.” When he joined the military, however, he began to feel that these claims were truer of his own white superiors, the white state’s authority figures.

The military’s treatment of its white soldiers could be considered torture, he remembered thinking. In basic training, he and fellow conscripts were deprived of water “to toughen us up.” His corporal regularly beat him and once tried to strangle him. “We had industrial ceiling fans, and I recall boys would put their hands in the fan” to break their fingers, Joseph said, so that they would be taken to the hospital and away from the horror. “I saw a boy break another boy’s leg with his rifle on purpose.” Many feigned mental illnesses just to leave the barracks. “I got blood poisoning, and I landed in the hospital, which I was so happy about.” After he got out of the military, he “went off the rails,” Joseph told me. “I was angry and aggressive. I got into a lot of drinking and drugs.” This was not uncommon, either. Rehabs throughout South Africa are full of white ex-conscripts.

Six months after Trump had offered white South Africans a free flight and fast track to citizenship to the most powerful economy on earth, fewer than 100 had taken up his offer.

The toll was measurable outside of the military. A 1982 medical study in the Journal of Public Health Policy compared the health of white South Africans with residents of England and Wales. It found that although white South Africans were economically better off than the English and Welsh cohorts and mostly just as healthy, they had a much higher rate of what are now called “deaths of despair”: White South African men were at triple the risk of suicide, and white South Africans of both genders were at more than four times the risk of death from liver cirrhosis, a disease associated with alcohol abuse.

During the 1980s, South African newspapers reported on a sharp rise in “family murders” in which white men killed their wives, kids, and themselves. “If a white South African man felt he’d let his community down, he could become so humiliated he decided he had to commit suicide — while retaining the right to take his family with him,” I wrote in my 2022 book on South Africa, The Inheritors. A white South African friend of mine recalled to me the day, still etched in his memory, that his teacher announced that the father of one of his classmates, despondent over the bankruptcy of his business, had killed the boy with a crossbow. Some white parents beat their children with the same whips the apartheid police used in Black neighborhoods.

For many white South Africans, the pain they experienced under apartheid lingers. During his insulated schooling and military training, nobody told Joseph that South Africa’s white civilian leaders had changed their view of Mandela and were beginning to negotiate with him. When Mandela became president, Joseph was “convinced there was going to be a civil war.” All the time, they were told that Black people were the enemy and “they were going to kill us all and murder our families and rape our women and take our homes.” Joseph’s father would say, “‘If Mandela gets out of jail, we’re dead.’ I was having 10 to 15 panic attacks a day.” Later, realizing how thoroughly he had bought into a false view of his Black compatriots, he felt tremendous guilt, although he’d also been brainwashed. He took up Buddhism to exorcise his demons. But, he says, “I still have rage issues. My marriage ended because of it.”

Six months after Trump had offered white South Africans a free flight and fast track to citizenship to the most powerful economy on earth, fewer than 100 had taken up his offer. By contrast, South Africa faced waves of white flight in the early 1960s, during the late 1970s, and throughout the 1980s. Reliable, comprehensive emigration statistics broken down by race under apartheid are hard to come by, but in 1961 alone, UNESCO calculated that no fewer than 25 faculty members resigned from the University of Cape Town to move overseas. A 1977 survey done at Johannesburg’s all-white University of the Witwatersrand found that 64 percent of graduating seniors said that they intended to “permanently settle in a country other than South Africa.” By 1985, 40 percent of white medical students and 45 percent of white business school students at that university left the country immediately after graduating. South Africa faced a skills shortage and business bankruptcies soared. In 1985, the U.S. consulate in Johannesburg reported that it was receiving, on average, 50 inquiries a day from people considering emigration.

As decades of repressive segregationist rule wore on, South Africa’s statist economy offered fewer opportunities to its white citizens. By the 1980s, it had become nakedly corrupt; come 1985, it was facing a sovereign-debt default. The currency collapsed, driving an inflation rate of nearly 20 percent. The construction industry laid off 40 percent of its workforce. Emigration became a business, as newspapers filled with advertisements from consultants offering to advise people on how to escape the country. Jokes went around: What is the definition of a South African patriot? Someone who can’t sell his house.

But emigrants often told newspapers that the reason they were leaving was not only economic. They were terrified that their children would be drafted; apartheid had become unbearable. “I just want to live, and more than that, I want my children to live in an environment free of the racial hatred that is poisoning my country,” one told The Guardian. Another who’d worked in America told the Journal of Commerce in 1987, “The more you see of the U.S., the less you want to involve yourself and your family in [South Africa’s] system.” In the end, in 1992, more than two-thirds of white people, motivated by fear and economic uncertainty, deserted the apartheid regime. In an all-white referendum on constitutional change held that year, 69 percent of the electorate chose to collapse their own government and establish a full democracy in which they knew they would have a minority of votes.

Mass revenge simply did not happen. That seems hard for people who never experienced such a total upending of a political hierarchy to understand. But in my years in South Africa, living in rural Afrikaner towns as well as in cities, I’ve heard much more about the shock white South Africans felt at how warmly their neighbors and colleagues of color have treated them than I’ve heard complaints about the opposite. An overwhelming number of South Africans of color understand that white people’s lives were not blissful under apartheid either.

Very few could escape the psychological distress apartheid generated.

In 2021, Jamie Gangat, a former anti-apartheid activist of Indian descent, found himself working at a rehabilitation program for ex-soldiers in a rural town called Harrismith, where he estimates that 10,000 white veterans have sought treatment over the past 20 years. Under apartheid, these men had been his enemy. Gangat’s maternal grandfather “was very close with Nelson Mandela,” he said; thanks to that and his family’s liberation activism the family had to flee South Africa when Gangat was six months old. The terrifying and degrading sense of being hunted affected his family long after they’d escaped. Because of it, he reckons, “My father [became] very quick to his gun. He ended up killing himself after trying to kill me and my brother.”

He was not expecting to feel sympathy for white ex-soldiers, but he did. They often said “they had a ‘demon’ in them,” he said. “My background, ironically, opened the doors for them to reveal their trauma. We realized we had much more in common than not.”

Don Lepati, a sixty-nine-year-old Black writer, spent his childhood under apartheid, but even back then he felt aware that his white fellow citizens were also the system’s victims. “The Immorality Act forced some white people to live like hunted animals,” he told me. “Those who showed even a semblance of humanity toward Black people, including preachers, were punished. White sportspeople suffered under the very apartheid laws their society had created.” Apartheid, he said, “was not comfortable or happy for many white people.”

When we consider cases of asymmetric power, we tend to assume that powerful people are essentially unaffected by the stark duality in which they participate. That they have it good. This certainly wasn’t white South Africans’ experience. Very few could escape the psychological distress apartheid generated. White South Africans have ceded some privilege: The Black-led government renamed some towns and streets for Black historical leaders, instituted a form of affirmative action for government contracts, and shifted the primary language of instruction from Afrikaans to the more universally understood English in many public schools. But sharing their world has not been as traumatic as many outsiders presume it is.

The South Africans who go on U.S. cable news and right-wing talk shows to talk about what they see as the disastrous situation in their country represent a tiny minority. They typically belong to two South African lobby groups that, over the past decade, have run extensive public relations campaigns abroad, pushing the idea that when people of color take the reins of governance in multiracial societies, they will end up violently persecuting their white neighbors. In 2017, the Suidlanders, a right-wing extremist group that has long predicted that a race war is imminent in South Africa, sent two charismatic speakers to the United States for a six-month madcap media tour. They appeared on Alex Jones’s radio show; live streamed with Mike Cernovich, a right-wing commentator whom Donald Trump Jr. has said deserves a Pulitzer Prize; and showed up at the infamous Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.

They barely advertised their tour back home, but the ideas they seeded soon leached into the U.S. right-wing mainstream. In 2018, Ann Coulter fielded an audience member’s question at a Breitbart town hall: “Why do you think the mainstream media has been silent on the genocide of white farmers in South Africa?” Wild applause broke out. “I am so glad you asked,” Coulter replied. She claimed that she had just visited a group of college students in Boulder, Colorado, and “every conservative question was about South Africa.”

Beginning in the mid-2010s, AfriForum, an organization dedicated to protecting the rights of Afrikaners, launched its own massive overseas PR campaign to spotlight white South Africans’ supposed victimization. The hope was to put pressure on the South African government to drop affirmative action for state contracts and pay extra attention to crime against white people. To get foreign conservatives’ attention, the group targeted major right-wing shows to cast white South Africans’ situation as a grim parable. Appearing on Fox News in 2021, Ernst Roets, AfriForum’s spokesperson, said, “In a way, the future has already happened in South Africa. And what I mean by that is that there are certain policies that people in the West, people in America, and so forth, are flirting with that have already been implemented in South Africa, and you can see the consequences.”

In South Africa, white South Africans mostly lampooned these efforts — and the handful of “refugees” that took up Trump’s offer. (An actor posted a TikTok video about the “pride” South Africans feel for generating “the best-fed, wealthiest refugees the world has ever seen.”) They objected bitterly to AfriForum’s depiction, noting that it had already made the overwhelming number of white South Africans who want to stay in their country suffer as Trump imposed tariffs that hurts their exports and dampens foreign tourism.

The real lesson from South Africa is that a police state wounds the people it claims to protect. A society that targets newspapers, universities, migrants, and protesters ultimately makes most of its supporters’ lives miserable, too. Often, moving toward a more just society is presented as the hard road. The arduous path. For so many white South Africans I have come to know, it was the easier one.

Eve Fairbanks

EVE FAIRBANKS writes about change: in cities, countries, landscapes, morals, values, and our ideas of ourselves. Her debut book The Inheritors, about South Africa, won the 2023 PEN/America John Kenneth Galbraith Award for Nonfiction and was a 2024 finalist for South Africa's top literary prize, the Sunday Times Award. A former political writer for The New Republic and current senior editor at Foreign Affairs, her essays and reportage have been published in The Guardian Long Reads, The New York Times, and The Atlantic, among other outlets. Born in Washington D.C. and raised in Virginia, she’s lived in South Africa for sixteen years.

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How much sleep does a banker need? A US court will decide

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Against Free Buses

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Much of the public discussion over A Better Billion, our proposal to increase New York’s subway construction spending by $1 billion a year in lieu of Zohran Mamdani’s free bus plan, has taken it for granted that free buses are good, and it’s just a matter of arguing over spending priorities. Charlie Komanoff, who I deeply respect, proposes to combine subway construction with making the buses free. And yet, free buses remain a bad idea, regardless of funding, because of the effects of breaking fare integration between buses and the subway. If there is money for making the buses free, and it must go to fare reductions rather than to better service, then it should go to a broad reduction in fares, especially if it can also reduce the monthly rate in order to align with best practices.

Planning with fare integration

The current situation in New York is that buses and the subway have nearly perfect fare integration: the fares are the same, the fare-capped passes apply to both modes equally, and one free transfer (bus-bus or bus-subway) is allowed before the passenger hits the cap. Regular riders who would be taking multi-transfer trips are likely to be hitting the cap anyway so that restriction, while annoying, doesn’t change how passengers travel.

Under this regime of fare integration, buses and the subway are planned together. The bus network is not planned to connect every pair of points in the city, because the subway does that at 2.5 times the average speed. Instead, it’s designed to connect subway deserts to the subway, offer crosstown service where the subway only points radially toward the Manhattan core, and run service on streets with such high demand that buses get high ridership even with a nearby subway. The same kinds of riders use both modes.

The bus network has accumulated a lot of cruft in it over the generations and the redesigns are half-measures, but there’s very little duplication of service, if we define duplication as a bus that is adjacent to the subway and has middling or weak ridership. For example, the B25 runs on Fulton on top of the A/C, and the B37 and B63 run respectively on Third and Fifth Avenues a block away from the R, and all have middling traffic. In contrast, the Bx1/2 runs on Grand Concourse on top of the B/D but is one of the highest-ridership buses in the system. B25-type situations are rare, and most of the bus service that needs to be cut as part of system modernization is of a different form, for example routes in Williamsburg that function as circulators with maybe half the borough’s average ridership per service hour.

In this schema, the replacement of a bus with a train is an unalloyed good. The train is faster, more reliable, more comfortable. Owing to those factors, the train can also support higher ridership and thus frequency. If the train stops every 800 meters and averages 30 km/h and the bus stops every 400 and averages 15 (the current New York average is much lower; 15 is what is possible with stop consolidation from 200 to 400 meter interstations and other treatments), then it takes a 2.5 km trip for the replacement to be worth it on trip time even for a passenger living right on top of the deleted bus stop, and a 5 km one if we take into account the walk penalty – and that’s before we include all the bonuses for rail travel over bus travel, which fall under the rubric of rail bias.

The consequences of differentiated fares

All of the above planning goes out the window if there are large enough differences in fares that passengers of different classes or travel patterns take different modes. Commuter rail, not part of this system of fare integration in New York or anywhere else in the United States, is not planned in coordination with the subway or the buses, and fundamentally can’t be until the fares are fixed. Indeed, busy buses run in parallel to faster but more expensive and less frequent commuter lines in New York and other American cities, and when the buses happen to feed the stations, as at Jamaica Station on the LIRR or some Metro-North stations or at some Fairmount Line stations in Boston, interchange volumes are limited.

Commuter rail has many problems in addition to fares. But when the subway charges noticeably higher fares than the bus to the point that passengers sort by class, the same planning problems emerge. In Washington, the cheap, flat-fare bus and more expensive, distance-based fare on Metro led to two classes of users on two distinct classes of transit. When Metro finally extended to Anacostia with the opening of the Green Line in 1991, an attempt to redesign the buses to feed the station rather than competing with Metro by going all the way into Downtown Washington led to civil rights protests and lawsuits alleging that it was racist to force low-income black riders onto the more expensive product.

Whenever fares are heavily differentiated, any shift toward the higher-fare service involves such a fight. One of the factors behind the reluctance of the New York public transit advocacy sphere to come out in favor of commuter rail improvements is that those are white middle class-coded because that’s the profile of the LIRR and Metro-North ridership, caused by a combination of high fares and poor urban service. Fare integration is a fight as well, but it’s one fight per city region rather than one fight per rail project.

And more to the point, New York doesn’t even need to have that one fight at least as far as subway-bus integration is concerned, because the subways and buses are already fare integrated. What’s more, free bus supporters like Mamdani and Komanoff aren’t proposing this out of belief that fares should be disintegrated, but out of belief that it’s a stalking horse for free transit, a policy that Komanoff has backed for decades (he proposed to pair it with congestion pricing in the Bloomberg era) and that the Democratic Socialists of America have been in favor of. The latter is loosely inspired by 1960s movements and by reading many tourist-level descriptions in the American press of European cities with too weak a transit system for revenue to matter very much. Free buses in this schema are on the road to fully free transit, but then the argument for them involves the very small share of transit revenue contributed by buses rather than the subway. In effect, an attempt to make the system free led to a proposal that could only ever result in disintegrated fares, even though that is not the intent.

But good intent does not make for a good program. That free buses are not proposed with the intent of breaking fare integration is irrelevant; if the program is implemented, it will break fare integration, and turn every bus redesign into a new political fight and even create demand for buses that have no reason to exist except to parallel subway lines. The program should be rejected, not just because it costs money that can be better spent on other things, but because it is in itself bad.



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sarcozona
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Editorial: Signals aren’t enough for scarred investors

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North American leaders are finding it difficult to cajole oil executives into making risky long-term investments.

No, we’re not referring to President Trump’s efforts to convince American energy giants to invest in Venezuela’s long neglected oil industry.

We’re referring to recent statements by the head of Canadian energy major Enbridge about its unwillingness to invest in a pipeline to move Alberta’s oil to Canada’s west coast. 

“I don’t think investors or the infrastructure companies should be taking on the risk of development in jurisdictions that have historically created a challenge,” Enbridge CEO Gregory Ebel said in a mid-February earnings call. 

Ebel reminded listeners that Enbridge poured $600 million into the Northern Gateway pipeline, only to have the government’s approval invalidated due to Ottawa’s failure to consult First Nations. From Ebel’s perspective, “the rug was pulled out from underneath.” 

“So that’s not the type of risk that we’re looking to take on at this time. We don’t need to with all the other opportunities,” Ebel added.

Premier Danielle Smith must be sorely disappointed to hear this.

Enbridge is one of just three companies chosen by the Alberta government to provide technical advice on a proposal for a new oil pipeline to the B.C. coast. 

That proposal is due by July 1, according to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that Alberta and Ottawa signed in November.

The MOU commits Alberta to advancing the development of a pipeline by the private sector. And it commits Ottawa to declaring that pipeline a priority and referring it to its newly formed Major Projects Office.

In the call, Ebel said the MOU was “very encouraging,” but not enough to encourage his battle-scarred company to invest.

“Obviously, there’s been lots of signs and signals. I think what we’re looking for is actually concrete actions,” he said.

Ebel’s statements may also come as a surprise — and disappointment — to Ottawa, which launched the Major Projects Office in one of the Carney government’s first acts. The office exists to get “nation-building” projects built faster by accelerating regulatory processes and helping coordinate financing.

For our part, we are disappointed but unfortunately not surprised to see that the MOU and Major Projects Office have not been enough to make a homegrown global pipeline leader invest in its home country. 

In October, we wrote that the Major Projects Office is, at best, a short-term solution. What Canada really needs is broad, structural reforms to improve the business environment for all — not just a few hand-selected projects Ottawa favours.

For those in doubt over whether such broader reforms are needed, consider this: in the World Bank Group’s recently released 2025 Business Ready report, Canada ranked 33rd for regulatory framework, behind such notable economies as Armenia, Costa Rica, Rwanda and Azerbaijan.  

According to the report, a country’s regulatory framework is considered one of three foundational pillars affecting a country’s business and investment climate. (Canada ranked, by contrast, 8th, in both of the other two key pillars: public services and operational efficiency.)

Unfortunately, we have seen no signals from Ottawa so far that it is contemplating such broader reforms.

Short of such efforts, desperate policymakers may find themselves catering to the specific demands of specific companies.

In the earnings call, Ebel spelled out, for example, what types of concrete actions Enbridge is looking for. 

In addition to a need for a commitment of stable policy, he mentioned possible government backstopping of a project until it is built. 

We would be strongly opposed to such a measure. Maintaining an unclear and haphazard regulatory framework and then providing financial backstops when projects fail would be an egregious dereliction of duty on the part of politicians. 

Instead, the government should be clear about the project parameters and approvals, and should fulfill its obligations, such as First Nations consultations. Once granted, its approvals should not be withdrawn. 

Ebel also noted that the outcome of Alberta and Ottawa’s negotiations over an industrial carbon charge would be critical. 

“That’s going to be super important for our customers, producers to get a feel for whether or not Canada is competitive enough for them to continue to see the kind of growth that we’ve been seeing,” he said. 

Now, you may hope Ottawa scraps the industrial carbon charge, or not. But we don’t want corporations swaying these types of policy decisions, simply because Ottawa is desperate to achieve its goal of diversifying trade.

Quick fixes will only work for so long. At some point, Canada is going to need to do the difficult work of structural reforms. The question is: for a self-professed generational leader, is Prime Minister Carney up for the challenge? 

The post Editorial: Signals aren’t enough for scarred investors appeared first on Canadian Affairs.

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A 20-year-old cancer vaccine may hold the key to long-term survival | ScienceDaily

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More than two decades ago, a small group of women with advanced breast cancer took part in a clinical trial that tested an experimental vaccine. All these years later, every one of them is still alive. Researchers say survival over such a long period is extremely uncommon for people with metastatic breast cancer, which is why the case drew renewed scientific attention.

Researchers at Duke Health took a closer look at the immune systems of the women who participated in the trial, which was led by Herbert Kim Lyerly, M.D., George Barth Geller Distinguished Professor of Immunology at Duke University School of Medicine. What they discovered surprised them. Even after many years, the women still had powerful immune cells that could recognize their cancer.

These immune cells shared a specific marker known as CD27. This marker plays an important role in helping the immune system remember past threats and respond to them again. The results, published in Science Immunology, point to CD27 as a possible way to make cancer vaccines far more effective.

"We were stunned to see such durable immune responses so many years later," said Zachary Hartman, Ph.D., senior author of the study and associate professor in the Departments of Surgery, Integrative Immunology and Pathologyat Duke University School of Medicine. "It made us ask: What if we could boost this response even more?"

Testing the CD27 Approach in the Lab

To explore that question, the research team ran experiments using mice. They combined a vaccine aimed at HER2 (a protein on the surface of some cells, including breast cancer) with an antibody designed to activate CD27. The results were striking. Nearly 40% of mice that received the combined treatment saw their tumors disappear completely. By comparison, only 6% of mice treated with the vaccine alone experienced the same outcome.

Further analysis showed that the CD27 antibody worked by greatly enhancing the activity of CD4+ T cells, a type of immune cell.

A Bigger Role for Overlooked Immune Cells

According to Hartman, CD4+ T cells, often called "helper" cells, do not usually get much attention in cancer research. Most studies focus instead on CD8+ "killer" T cells, which are known for directly attacking tumors. This study suggests the helper cells may be just as important. They appear to drive lasting immune memory and support other immune cells so they can work more effectively.

When researchers added another antibody that further supports CD8+ T cells, tumor rejection rates in mice climbed to nearly 90%.

"This study really shifts our thinking," Hartman said. "It shows that CD4+ T cells aren't just supporting actors; they can be powerful cancer fighters in their own right and are possibly essential for truly effective anti-tumor responses."

Implications for Future Cancer Treatments

The team also discovered that the CD27 antibody only needed to be given once, at the same time as the vaccine, to produce long lasting effects. This simplicity could make it easier to pair the approach with existing cancer treatments, including immune checkpoint inhibitors and antibody-drug conjugates already used in patients.

Hartman believes these findings may help cancer vaccines finally reach their full promise.

"We've known for a long time that vaccines can work against cancer, but they haven't lived up to the hype," he said. "This could be a missing piece of the puzzle."

The study received funding from the National Institutes of Health (117 R01CA238217-01A1/02S1) and the Department of Defense (W81XWH-20-1-034618 and W81XWH-21-2-0031).

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sarcozona
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For those who don’t contain a vast knowledge of Green Day lore like myself, I don’t think it is…

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posttexasstressdisorder:

ithinkhesgaybutwesavedmufasa:

For those who don’t contain a vast knowledge of Green Day lore like myself, I don’t think it is hitting just how much of a “fuck you” the NFL is giving djt/the white house.

This is a band that is:

  • Made entirely of openly bisexual/queer men
  • Made entirely of men who are vocal about being raised by single mothers on welfare
  • One of their members was adopted and raised by a Black woman and has said he “understands how his mother could hate ‘the white man’ and love him with her whole soul.”
  • Were the first band to say, “No Trump, No KKK, No Fascist/MAGA U.S.A.” on live television without ANY warning.
  • Literally released a song last year called, “The American Dream Is Killing Me”
  • Only hires ALL FEMALE bands to open for them to address inequality in the music industry
  • OPENLY tells trump supporters they are not welcome at their concerts.

Anyway, Enjoy Feb. 8th Magats! You’re gonna hate it. :)

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sarcozona
5 days ago
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Nadezh
8 days ago
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Melbourne, Australia
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