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Global Assessment of COVID-19 Mortality Displacement From 2020 to 2024

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For most of the last century, high-income countries experienced annual declines in age-specific mortality rates.1 However, the COVID-19 pandemic created upturns in mortality rates between 2020 and 2021 in many high-income countries.2-4 In the wake of the pandemic, some mortality rates have resumed their pre–COVID-19 pattern of annual declines. However, a portion of the mortality decline observed immediately after a pandemic can be explained by mortality displacement (also referred to as the mortality harvesting effect, harvesting, and the harvesting effect). This occurs when the pandemic causes frail or high-risk individuals, who would have died in the near future, to die earlier than they otherwise would have. As a result, the months or years following the crisis may show fewer deaths than expected because many of the most at-risk individuals had already died prematurely.5 This demographic phenomenon has been documented after previous health crises, including epidemics, pandemics, severe influenza seasons, and heat waves, and could therefore be plausibly observed following COVID-19 as well.6-8

In parallel, other factors may drive postpandemic mortality decline. Rapid scale-up of vaccination campaigns reduced COVID-19–related mortality and helped prevent future waves.9,10 On average, easing COVID-19 mobility and cross-border restrictions coincided with a rebound in trade and travel, contributing to a partial economic recovery and some improvements in employment and poverty, which are key social determinants of health, although these gains were highly unequal between and within countries.11-17 Together, these multiple processes shape observed mortality trends after a pandemic and underscore the need to distinguish the temporary mortality displacement from longer-term recovery. Disentangling the contribution of mortality displacement from other population health drivers is crucial to accurately assess the pandemic’s true burden and to guide public health strategies during system recovery.18

There are various methods to calculate excess mortality.19-23 Overall, these studies affirm the general approach to estimate excess deaths relative to a projected baseline of expected deaths before the pandemic. While commonly used during periods of elevated mortality, the method also applies when observed deaths fall below baseline, often termed negative excess or deficit mortality. In both cases, estimates are benchmarked against the counterfactual of uninterrupted prepandemic trends. However, a critical gap involves quantifying the extent of the mortality displacement on mortality across different age groups immediately following the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior studies focusing on excess mortality have a limited scope, concentrating on the pandemic period and not covering the postpandemic recovery phase.

Bor et al22 provided insights into postpandemic mortality declines in the US, and Riou et al24 provided findings of those in Switzerland; however, a multicountry analysis of the mortality displacement across age groups, to our knowledge, is largely absent. Thus, this study systematically measured the mortality displacement using high-quality data available by country, year, age, and sex following the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this cross-sectional study, we used the Short-Term Mortality Fluctuations dataset, which compiles harmonized weekly all-cause mortality statistics from national vital registration systems of multiple countries. We extracted weekly mortality data covering the period from January 2015 through December 2024 for 34 selected countries. Most included countries were classified as high-income economies by the World Bank; Bulgaria (newly reclassified to high-income in fiscal year 2025) was included because of its reliable and harmonized mortality surveillance system.25 This study represents a secondary analysis of publicly available aggregate data from the Human Mortality Database, without patient or public involvement; as such, this study did not require institutional review board approval or informed patient consent, in accordance with 45 CFR §46. The study followed the Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) reporting guideline.

Mortality data were stratified by country, year, week, sex, and age groups (0-14 years, 15-64 years, 65-74 years, 75-84 years, and ≥85 years). The Short-Term Mortality Fluctuations dataset provided both weekly death counts and weekly death rates, with death rates calculated as the number of deaths occurring each week divided by the annual population exposure, normalized to weekly units. Data for each year typically included 52 weeks; week 53 was excluded to ensure comparability across years. Countries included in the analysis were categorized into 5 quintiles based on the severity of their cumulative excess mortality from January 2020 to December 2022. Mortality displacement was hypothesized to have been highest in countries with the highest January 2020 to December 2022 excess mortality and negligible in countries with the lowest January 2020 to December 2022 mortality. Quintiles were defined from the lowest excess mortality (quintile 1) to the highest excess mortality (quintile 5), providing a structured comparison of pandemic outcomes across countries.

We defined 2020 to 2022 (or 2020 to 2023) as the pandemic period, and 2023 to 2024 (or only 2024) as the postpandemic period; this definition was applied consistently in all analyses. To illustrate the analytic concept, a stylized mortality index for 2015 to 2025 under 2 counterfactual scenarios, 1 with mortality displacement (Figure, A) and 1 without (Figure, B), is shown. In both panels, the prepandemic trend from 2015 to 2019 is extrapolated and represents the number of deaths expected had the pandemic not occurred. A temporary spike in deaths from 2020 to 2022 is shown in the Figure. In the scenario without mortality displacement, deaths returned to the projected trend from 2023 onward; in the scenario with mortality displacement, deaths fell below the projected trend in 2023 and 2024, creating a visible gap in the prepandemic trend.

Figure.  Stylized Mortality Index Under 2 Counterfactual Scenarios, 2015 to 2025

The black lines extrapolate the prepandemic trend from 2015 to 2019 and represent the number of deaths expected had the pandemic not occurred. In the mortality displacement scenario, the deficit below the line indicates mortality displacement.

In our empirical analysis, we treated this gap as an association with mortality displacement and quantified it in 3 steps. First, for each country and year, we project the expected number of deaths in 2020 to 2024 by extending the 2015-to-2019 trend. Second, we summed the excess deaths from 2020 to 2022 (or from 2020 to 2023), defined as deaths above this expected level. Third, we summed the mortality deficit during 2023 to 2024 (or only 2024), defined as deaths falling below the expected level. The mortality displacement fraction was then interpreted as the share of the initial excess deaths in 2020 to 2022 (or 2020 to 2023) that was paid back by the mortality deficit in 2023 to 2024 or only 2024 (ie, the ratio of the postpandemic deficit to the pandemic-period excess). The methodologic details for each step are described.

The expected weekly deaths were estimated with an overdispersed Poisson generalized linear model using historical mortality data from the prepandemic period (2015-2019). For each country (c), sex (s), and age group (a), we fitted prepandemic data (week 1, 2015, to week 52, 2019) as follows in Equation 119,21,26:

Image description not available. (opens in new tab)

in which μc,s,a(t) is the expected number of deaths at week t; Ec,s,a(t) is the weekly person-weeks exposure used as an offset; and β5,c,s,a(year) adjusted for temporal trend. Two harmonic pairs captured the dominant annual and semiannual seasonal components. Robust SEs were used to accommodate overdispersion. Based on each country’s parameters for age and sex, we projected death counts for week 1, 2020, to week 52, 2024. Afterward, we compared the observed weekly number of deaths in 2020 to 2024 with the expected number of weekly deaths for each country, stratified by age and sex, to estimate weekly excess mortality. Specifically, weekly excess deaths for 2020 to 2024 were calculated in Equation 2: excessc,s,a(t) = dc,s,a(t) − μ̂c,s,a(t), in which μ̂c,s,a(t) is the fitted value from Equation 1. Annual excess mortality rates per 100 000 Rc,s,a,y were obtained by Equation 3:

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Given the linear trend in expected mortality derived from 2015 to 2019, having an excess mortality rate of 0 in 2023 or 2024 would imply exactly resuming the established pre–COVID-19 mortality decline. If a country did better than achieving 0 excess mortality in 2023 or 2024, then it signals the potential presence of mortality displacement. It is also possible that a country superseded its pre–COVID-19 population health performance by improving the overall health system. However, if the country was in a high quintile for COVID-19–era excess deaths, then mortality displacement became a more plausible explanation. To isolate mortality displacement from chance, we defined mortality displacement as a sustained cumulative postpandemic mortality deficit in 2023 and 2024 or in 2024, conditional on a positive excess in 2020 to 2022 (or 2020 to 2023). Deficits were assessed against the bootstrapped 95% prediction interval of the prepandemic baseline. For each qualifying stratum, we then computed the cumulative excess mortality during the initial surge (2020-2022 or 2020-2023) and the subsequent deficit (2023-2024 or 2024). The mortality displacement fraction20 was finally expressed in Equation 4:

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or Equation 5:

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To obtain 95% CIs for both Rc,s,a,y, we performed nonparametric bootstrapping with 1000 resamples. For each bootstrap replicate, we resampled the weekly mortality data with replacement within each country-sex-age stratum. For each resample, we reestimated the expected deaths by refitting Equation 1, recomputing excess deaths and the excess death rate in Equations 2 and 3, and recalculating the mortality displacement ratio in Equations 4 and 5. The 2.5 percentile of the resulting bootstrap distributions was taken as the lower 95% CI bound and the 97.5 percentile as the upper 95% CI bound.

We conducted 3 prespecified sensitivity analyses to evaluate robustness: (1) refitting the baseline model using a negative binomial specification, (2) fitting a Poisson generalized estimating equation with an autoregressive (AR[1]) working correlation structure to account for serial correlation in weekly deaths, and (3) repeating all models using broader age bands (0-64 years, 65-74 years, 75-84 years, and ≥85 years) to reduce sparsity in age-specific strata. To address the risk of an inflated type I error from multiple hypothesis testing, we used the Benjamini-Hochberg adjustment to control the false discovery rate (q ≤ 0.05). We compared the main results with the unadjusted P values to assess the outcome of the adjustment. A 2-sided P < .05 was considered statistically significant. All calculations were performed using Stata, version 18.5 (StataCorp LLC).

Our analysis included 352 182 284 deaths in 34 countries from 2015 to 2024; the median (IQR) population composition in 2020 was 50.75% (50.33%-51.44%) females, 49.25% (48.56%-49.67%) males, and 19.64% (17.74%-20.64%) aged 65 years or older. Based on Equation 1, we found that in the prepandemic period (2015-2019), 13 countries (Australia, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, England and Wales, and Austria) exhibited significant negative mortality trends (eg, Australia: rate, −0.0212 [95% CI, −0.0234 to −0.0190]; P <.001), 8 (Portugal, Slovenia, Czechia, Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, and Poland) showed significant positive trends (eg, Portugal: rate, 0.0096 [95% CI, 0.0033 to 0.0160]; P = .003), and the remaining 13 were fairly similar over time (eTable 3 in Supplement 1). We defined baselines as well-estimated if they were significant.

The cumulative excess death rate per 100 000 (based on mean population) for 2020 to 2022 compared with expected deaths based on 2015-to-2019 mortality is provided in Table 1 and for 2020 to 2024 in Table 2. Positive values indicate more deaths than expected; negative values indicate fewer deaths than expected. The 34 countries were grouped into 5 quintiles according to their cumulative excess death rate in 2020 to 2022 (CEDR20-22). In the lowest quintile, the CEDR20-22 values were −21 (95% CI, −35 to −6) per 100 000 for New Zealand, 3 (95% CI, −37 to 42) per 100 000 for Luxembourg, 26 (95% CI, 6 to 46) per 100 000 for Denmark, 81 (95% CI, 68 to 94) per 100 000 for Australia, 82 (95% CI, 62 to 103) per 100 000 for Norway, 108 (95% CI, 93 to 124) for per 100 000 Israel, and 113 (95% CI, 62 to 165) per 100 000 for Iceland, with all values except Luxembourg achieving statistical significance. New Zealand’s value of −21 indicates that it was able to sustain better-than-expected mortality declines even during the 2020-to-2022 period. New Zealand’s reduction persisted through 2020 to 2024 (−35), and Denmark (−21) and Luxembourg (−100) also recorded reductions. New Zealand pulled off statistically significantly negative cumulative excess mortality from 2020 to 2024 in all age groups except ages 75 to 84 years. Notably, Denmark and Luxembourg, with the lowest COVID-19–era mortality, exhibited significant cumulative negative excess mortality among individuals aged 85 years or older from 2020 to 2024. The remaining quintile 1 countries, namely Denmark, Australia, Norway, Israel, and Iceland, failed to sustain negative values and showed statistically significant excess mortality from 2020 to 2024. Conversely, CEDR20-22 values for Poland were 520 (95% CI, 457 to 584) per 100 000; Latvia, 540 (95% CI, 474 to 606) per 100 000; Slovakia, 549 (95% CI, 487 to 611) per 100 000; Croatia, 600 (95% CI, 532 to 668) per 100 000; Lithuania, 814 (95% CI, 740 to 887) per 100 000; and Bulgaria, 1070 (95% CI, 955 to 1186) per 100 000.

Table 1.  Cumulative Excess Death Rate Per 100 000 Population From 2020 to 2022 by Country Compared With Expected Deaths Based on 2015 to 2019 Mortality

Excess mortality quintileaCountryCumulative excess deaths per 100 000 (95% CI)b
1New Zealand−21 (−35 to −6)
1Luxembourg3 (−37 to 42)
1Denmark26 (6 to 46)
1Australia81 (68 to 94)
1Norway82 (62 to 103)
1Israel108 (93 to 124)
1Iceland113 (62 to 165)
2Sweden131 (105 to 156)
2Canada142 (128 to 157)
2Finland167 (140 to 194)
2France201 (171 to 231)
2Germany212 (180 to 244)
2Switzerland213 (178 to 249)
2Netherlands230 (199 to 261)
3Northern Ireland235 (196 to 273)
3Belgium258 (212 to 304)
3England and Wales268 (226 to 311)
3Portugal271 (225 to 318)
3Scotland280 (239 to 321)
3Spain301 (251 to 350)
3Slovenia319 (265 to 373)
4Austria321 (283 to 359)
4Greece355 (315 to 395)
4Estonia358 (313 to 403)
4United States405 (375 to 434)
4Italy443 (393 to 493)
4Hungary456 (398 to 514)
4Czechia514 (451 to 577)
5Poland520 (457 to 584)
5Latvia540 (474 to 606)
5Slovakia549 (487 to 611)
5Croatia600 (532 to 668)
5Lithuania814 (740 to 887)
5Bulgaria1070 (955 to 1186)

Table 2.  Cumulative Excess Death Rate Per 100 000 Population From 2020 to 2024 by Country Compared With Expected Deaths Based on 2015 to 2019 Mortality

Excess mortality quintileaCountryCumulative excess deaths per 100 000 (95% CI)b
1Luxembourg−100 (−150 to −49)
1New Zealand−35 (−53 to −16)
1Denmark−21 (−47 to 6)
1Israel126 (105 to 146)
1Norway152 (128 to 177)
1Australia158 (142 to 175)
2Sweden169 (140 to 199)
2Canada172 (155 to 189)
2France225 (194 to 257)
2Iceland233 (168 to 299)
2Finland259 (225 to 293)
2Germany261 (224 to 298)
2Portugal297 (247 to 348)
2Switzerland301 (262 to 340)
3Belgium306 (257 to 354)
3Greece323 (278 to 367)
3Slovenia330 (273 to 388)
3Netherlands341 (307 to 375)
3Estonia364 (310 to 419)
3New England and Wales366 (319 to 412)
3Spain386 (332 to 439)
4Northern Ireland394 (344 to 443)
4Scotland404 (353 to 455)
4Poland413 (351 to 475)
4Latvia429 (358 to 501)
4United States431 (401 to 462)
4Austria446 (401 to 490)
4Hungary474 (412 to 535)
5Italy529 (477 to 581)
5Slovakia549 (487 to 610)
5Czechia578 (513 to 642)
5Croatia703 (630 to 776)
5Lithuania1028 (951 to 1105)
5Bulgaria1127 (1009 to 1245)

The cumulative excess deaths per 100 000 population from 2020 to 2024 by country and age group, relative to expected deaths based on 2015-to-2019 mortality is shown in Table 3. Notably, 22 of 34 countries recorded negative or insignificantly positive cumulative excess mortality from 2020 to 2024 for those aged 0 to 14 years. However, only 6 countries recorded reduced excess mortality for individuals aged older than 14 years, among which 4 of 6 countries were in quintile 1, and the remaining 2 countries had statistically insignificant reductions. In all countries, older age groups recorded much greater cumulative excess mortality compared with younger age groups across the entire 2020-to-2024 period.

Table 3.  Cumulative Excess Deaths Per 100 000 Population From 2020 to 2024 by Country and Age Group Relative to Expected Deaths Based on 2015 to 2019 Mortality

Excess mortality quintileaCountryCumulative excess deaths per 100 000 (95% CI)b
Ages 0-14 yAges 15-64 yAges 65-74 yAges 75-84 yAges ≥85 y
1Australia0 (−1 to 2)31 (26 to 37)217 (179 to 254)1040 (923 to 1157)2813 (2320 to 3306)
1Denmark9 (0 to 17)10 (−0 to 21)−155 (−233 to −77)563 (372 to 754)−2388 (−3173 to −1604)
1Iceland90 (61 to 119)−39 (−75 to −3)1247 (969 to 1525)326 (−381 to 1033)6541 (4121 to 8962)
1Israel4 (−3 to 11)55 (30 to 80)470 (397 to 544)343 (142 to 543)2991 (2290 to 3692)
1Luxembourg7 (−22 to 36)−108 (−136 to −80)71 (−166 to 309)−147 (−670 to 376)−1268 (−2859 to 323)
1Norway−4 (−10 to 3)32 (23 to 42)98 (21 to 175)840 (636 to 1043)3214 (2425 to 4002)
1New Zealand−20 (−23 to −18)−26 (−38 to −15)−5 (−68 to 58)404 (247 to 560)−1907 (−2653 to −1161)
2Canada10 (8 to 12)79 (70 to 87)345 (304 to 385)1216 (1107 to 1324)533 (3 to 1064)
2Switzerland15 (8 to 22)37 (30 to 45)156 (86 to 225)1468 (1254 to 1682)5900 (4845 to 6955)
2Germany−0 (−2 to 2)82 (74 to 91)680 (613 to 748)1763 (1581 to 1946)−273 (−1149 to 602)
2Finland−5 (−11 to 1)39 (26 to 51)340 (264 to 416)991 (801 to 1180)4081 (3370 to 4792)
2France−2 (−4 to 1)2 (−5 to 8)175 (124 to 226)658 (488 to 827)4726 (4072 to 5380)
2Netherlands−3 (−7 to 2)67 (60 to 74)506 (441 to 571)1945 (1736 to 2154)4814 (3826 to 5803)
2Sweden17 (12 to 22)47 (39 to 54)50 (−18 to 118)1291 (1116 to 1467)1342 (545 to 2139)
3Belgium−36 (−41 to −31)65 (54 to 76)293 (196 to 390)1398 (1091 to 1705)5170 (3918 to 6422)
3Spain4 (1 to 7)23 (15 to 31)394 (308 to 480)1518 (1213 to 1823)6900 (5708 to 8092)
3England and Wales9 (6 to 12)96 (83 to 110)491 (378 to 605)1611 (1286 to 1936)5946 (4648 to 7243)
3Northern Ireland3 (−10 to 15)88 (59 to 118)1164 (997 to 1331)2190 (1796 to 2584)4459 (3081 to 5836)
3Scotland11 (3 to 19)31 (11 to 52)1012 (886 to 1139)1177 (844 to 1510)7916 (6797 to 9035)
3Portugal−20 (−26 to −13)27 (15 to 40)441 (357 to 524)659 (388 to 931)5032 (4039 to 6025)
3Slovenia−5 (−16 to 5)65 (43 to 88)528 (373 to 683)2295 (1870 to 2719)2573 (1111 to 4035)
4Austria−4 (−10 to 2)82 (71 to 93)506 (421 to 591)3869 (3624 to 4114)2734 (1769 to 3698)
4Czechia−22 (−27 to −17)92 (71 to 114)903 (690 to 1117)3852 (3392 to 4312)8083 (6531 to 9634)
4Estonia23 (8 to 38)271 (241 to 302)553 (344 to 762)1615 (1228 to 2001)631 (−561 to 1823)
4Greece0 (−6 to 6)71 (55 to 87)530 (432 to 628)1494 (1263 to 1725)2605 (1713 to 3497)
4Hungary15 (8 to 22)97 (62 to 131)1301 (1075 to 1526)2828 (2308 to 3348)3235 (1913 to 4556)
4Italy−4 (−6 to −1)72 (64 to 81)679 (588 to 770)2095 (1849 to 2342)5944 (5107 to 6781)
4United States17 (15 to 19)195 (172 to 218)981 (882 to 1079)2537 (2317 to 2757)3738 (3059 to 4418)
5Bulgaria−8 (−18 to 2)238 (176 to 299)2384 (1940 to 2829)5497 (4658 to 6335)14 405 (12 421 to 16 388)
5Croatia4 (−6 to 15)58 (33 to 83)1699 (1509 to 1889)3462 (2954 to 3969)8573 (7207 to 9940)
5Lithuania15 (3 to 26)442 (405 to 480)2070 (1858 to 2282)4281 (3807 to 4755)8077 (6652 to 9502)
5Latvia2 (−11 to 15)204 (156 to 251)1246 (1001 to 1490)2454 (1929 to 2979)−647 (−2191 to 896)
5Poland−15 (−18 to −12)34 (5 to 63)996 (766 to 1226)2124 (1567 to 2680)7695 (6287 to 9104)
5Slovakia−4 (−14 to 7)142 (109 to 176)1380 (1123 to 1637)4258 (3603 to 4914)5038 (3551 to 6525)

The annual excess mortality per 100 000 population and the estimated mortality displacement by country from 2020 to 2024 are provided in Table 4. Even though in quintile 1, the highest observed mortality displacement ratios were found in Denmark at 180% and in Luxembourg at 2770%, these results were statistically insignificant and likely reflect their relatively low early excess mortality combined with substantial subsequent mortality deficits, rather than a large absolute displacement of deaths. However, 3 countries exhibited significant mortality displacement. In particular, Greece at 10% (95% CI, 4%-15%), Latvia at 21% (95% CI, 14%-28%), and Poland at 21% (95% CI, 17%-25%) showed mortality displacement ratios with statistical significance. By 2024, the US had returned to its prepandemic stable trend (3 [95% CI, −2 to 7] per 100 000). In contrast, most European countries (including Norway, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, the UK, Austria, Italy, and Lithuania) had not yet resumed their prepandemic trajectories, exhibiting excess mortality rates ranging from 11 (95% CI, 3 to 18) per 100 000 in France to 115 (95% CI, 94 to 135) per 100 000 in Lithuania.

Table 4.  Annual Excess Death Rate Per 100 000 Population and Estimated Mortality Displacement by Country From 2020 to 2024 Relative to Expected Deaths Based on 2015 to 2019 Mortality

Excess mortality quintileaCountryAnnual excess deaths per 100 000 (95% CI)Mortality displacement ratio (95% CI), %b
20202021202220232024
1Australia−16 (−21 to −11)15 (10 to 20)81 (67 to 94)38 (31 to 46)39 (32 to 46)NA
1Denmark−21 (−31 to −10)12 (−2 to 25)35 (23 to 46)−2 (−13 to 9)−44 (−57 to −30)180 (−217 to 577)
1Iceland3 (−25 to 31)9 (−18 to 37)99 (64 to 133)58 (29 to 87)60 (28 to 92)NA
1Israel28 (19 to 36)42 (34 to 50)39 (29 to 48)5 (−10 to 20)14 (9 to 19)NA
1Luxembourg25 (1 to 49)1 (−20 to 22)−22 (−43 to −2)−45 (−67 to −24)−54 (−75 to −33)2770 (−41 884 to 47 424)
1Norway−9 (−18 to −0)14 (1 to 27)77 (62 to 92)35 (24 to 45)35 (24 to 46)NA
1New Zealand−45 (−56 to −35)−16 (−23 to −10)40 (30 to 50)8 (−0 to 17)−22 (−29 to −15)NA
2Canada33 (25 to 42)32 (26 to 38)76 (65 to 87)33 (27 to 39)−3 (−11 to 5)2 (−2 to 5)
2Switzerland94 (62 to 125)41 (28 to 54)79 (62 to 95)46 (34 to 58)43 (32 to 53)NA
2Germany28 (12 to 43)71 (53 to 89)113 (91 to 136)49 (36 to 62)−0 (−14 to 14)0 (−3 to 3)
2Finland6 (−4 to 16)36 (23 to 49)125 (104 to 146)80 (61 to 100)12 (1 to 23)NA
2France73 (51 to 96)57 (44 to 69)71 (55 to 88)14 (6 to 22)11 (3 to 18)NA
2Netherlands76 (54 to 98)87 (67 to 106)68 (54 to 81)55 (45 to 65)57 (48 to 66)NA
2Sweden73 (54 to 92)18 (7 to 29)40 (28 to 51)35 (23 to 46)4 (−5 to 14)NA
3Belgium153 (109 to 196)36 (23 to 49)70 (54 to 86)24 (14 to 34)25 (15 to 34)NA
3Spain147 (99 to 194)63 (49 to 77)91 (71 to 111)37 (28 to 46)49 (34 to 64)NA
3England and Wales119 (85 to 154)85 (64 to 107)64 (48 to 79)66 (51 to 81)32 (22 to 42)NA
3Northern Ireland85 (61 to 109)86 (62 to 111)64 (44 to 83)66 (42 to 89)93 (72 to 115)NA
3Scotland103 (73 to 133)99 (80 to 118)78 (59 to 97)81 (60 to 101)44 (28 to 59)NA
3Portugal87 (65 to 108)96 (62 to 131)89 (67 to 110)20 (8 to 32)8 (−8 to 23)NA
3Slovenia144 (96 to 192)107 (81 to 134)68 (48 to 88)14 (−4 to 31)−2 (−19 to 14)1 (−3 to 4)
4Austria91 (67 to 116)103 (84 to 123)126 (104 to 148)79 (62 to 95)47 (31 to 64)NA
4Czechia151 (113 to 189)269 (226 to 312)94 (75 to 113)30 (18 to 43)32 (20 to 45)NA
4Estonia18 (−3 to 40)221 (187 to 255)119 (95 to 143)11 (−13 to 35)−5 (−28 to 18)1 (−4 to 7)
4Greece56 (40 to 73)171 (139 to 203)129 (105 to 152)−1 (−12 to 11)−34 (−51 to −17)10 (4 to 15)
4Hungary100 (65 to 135)271 (228 to 313)85 (69 to 102)10 (−2 to 22)5 (−10 to 21)NA
4Italy174 (135 to 213)127 (108 to 147)141 (115 to 167)54 (43 to 66)30 (18 to 42)NA
4United States141 (120 to 162)166 (148 to 185)98 (84 to 111)25 (21 to 30)3 (−2 to 7)NA
5Bulgaria220 (158 to 281)624 (536 to 711)227 (182 to 271)9 (−5 to 22)37 (18 to 55)NA
5Croatia128 (90 to 166)300 (249 to 350)173 (142 to 203)45 (29 to 61)56 (37 to 75)NA
5Lithuania193 (152 to 234)386 (337 to 436)235 (200 to 270)97 (78 to 116)115 (94 to 135)NA
5Latvia38 (12 to 64)353 (302 to 405)150 (122 to 178)−5 (−30 to 20)−109 (−139 to −79)21 (14 to 28)
5Poland159 (117 to 201)278 (234 to 322)83 (67 to 99)−39 (−48 to −30)−71 (−81 to −62)21 (17 to 25)
5Slovakia86 (63 to 109)356 (303 to 410)106 (89 to 124)5 (−7 to 17)−5 (−16 to 7)1 (−1 to 3)

The annual excess death rate and mortality displacement by country and age group are presented in eFigures 1-5 and eTable 1 in Supplement 1. Significant mortality displacement were observed in 0 of 3 countries in the 0-to-14–year age group, in 6 of 15 countries in the 15-to-64–year age group, in 5 of 15 countries in the 65-to-74–year age group, and in 4 of 8 countries in the 75-to-84–year age group, with effect magnitudes ranging from 7% to 68% in the 15-to-64–year age group, 8% to 62% in the 65-to-74–year age group, and 9% to 42% in the 75-to-84–year age group. Notably, in the 85 years or older age group, the mortality displacement was more pronounced, with 10 of 13 countries showing significant mortality displacement, ranging from 6% to 106%. Across all 25 significant age-group findings, 40% were from countries in mortality-burdened quintile 5, and 32% were from countries in mortality-burdened quintile 4, indicating that the highest burdened countries were disproportionately associated with the observed significant mortality displacement. The mortality displacement did not differ significantly between females and males in the younger age groups, as shown in eTable 2 in Supplement 1. However, in the 85 years or older age group, the difference was more pronounced, with 12 of 34 countries exhibiting insignificantly higher mortality displacement in females compared with only 3 countries where mortality displacement was higher in males.

The sensitivity analyses generally supported the robustness of our findings (eTables 4-6 in Supplement 1). For Greece, Latvia, and Poland, mortality displacement ratios and 95% CIs were very similar across the negative binomial, the AR(1) generalized estimating equation, and alternative age-band specifications, and all 3 countries remained classified as having significant mortality displacement. In the US, however, the 2024 excess mortality estimate was close to 0 and not statistically different from the baseline in the primary model (3 [95% CI, −2 to 7] per 100 000) but became a modest deficit under the AR(1) generalized estimating equation specification (−9 [95% CI, −14 to −3] per 100 000), consistent with a possible mortality displacement. Because these estimates are small in magnitude and lie near the null, we interpreted the US mortality displacement signal as sensitive to modeling assumptions about serial correlation. After applying the false discovery rate correction, the pattern of statistical significance generally remained consistent with the unadjusted P values (eTable 7 in Supplement 1). This suggests that controlling for multiple testing was not associated with the interpretation of our results.

This cross-sectional study found the magnitude and heterogeneity of the recovery and sustained decline in mortality across 34 countries following the COVID-19 pandemic, with results stratified by age, sex, and mortality quintile. The primary outcome of this research assesses how excess mortality during the pandemic was associated with subsequent mortality displacement. Statistically significant mortality displacement was seen in only 3 countries where pandemic-era excess mortality was high (Greece, Latvia, and Poland). They were predominantly observed among the oldest age group (≥85 years).

Our study also found the pace of recovery of pre–COVID-19 mortality trends. By 2024, the US had returned to its prepandemic pattern of relatively stable all-cause mortality. In contrast, as of 2024, most European countries, including Norway, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, the UK, Austria, Italy, and Lithuania, had still not resumed their prepandemic mortality trajectories. Among the 8 countries (Portugal, Slovenia, Czechia, Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, and Poland) with prepandemic positive mortality trends, 5 countries (Portugal, Slovenia, Czechia, Bulgaria, and Croatia) continued to experience significant excess mortality or sustained elevated baseline mortality. Of the 8 countries that had rising pre–COVID-19 mortality trends, only those achieving negative excess mortality would represent a return to conditions that were normal for high-income health systems. This situation prompts consideration of whether persistent outcomes from the pandemic, associated with sustained health system strain or depleted population health capital, may have continued to influence mortality patterns through 2024.

Our study also offers insight into the cumulative outcome of COVID-19 when including both the pandemic period of 2020 to 2022 and the recovery years of 2023 to 2024. Luxembourg uniquely demonstrated a statistically significantly faster-than-expected reduction in mortality, whereas New Zealand and Denmark maintained their expected rates of mortality decline. New Zealand had statistically significantly negative cumulative excess mortality from 2020 to 2024 in all age groups except ages 75 to 84 years. However, this was exceptional. For the 7 countries in the best quintile of low COVID-19–era mortality, most age groups experienced positive cumulative excess mortality when summing 2020 to 2024. Notably, Denmark and Luxembourg, with the lowest COVID-19–era mortality, exhibited significant cumulative negative excess mortality among individuals aged 85 years or older from 2020 to 2024. This is hard to explain and may be potentially due to factors such as smaller sample sizes, imprecise denominators, high mobility among older populations, and the suppression of influenza during 2020.

Most top-performing countries regarding overall excess mortality did not succeed in sustaining overall declines in mortality from 2020 to 2024. The worse the cumulative death rate was in 2020 to 2022, the worse the cumulative mortality was for 2020 to 2024. In other words, mortality displacement did not compensate for failing to protect the population during the pandemic. Although younger cohorts showed lower net mortality, associated with the 50-year trend toward better health of younger ages, the significant and persistent excess mortality among older adults, even in the presence of mortality displacement, demonstrates that targeted protection alone was insufficient. The scale of mortality displacement observed in the most affected countries may further indicate that any shielding strategies used in those countries failed to adequately protect high-risk groups.

Multiple factors contribute to the COVID-19 mortality displacement. Extensive studies have found that the pandemic disproportionately affected older adults and individuals with preexisting comorbidities, including type 2 diabetes,27-29 high blood pressure,30-32 and obesity.33-35 Additionally, in countries with high COVID-19 mortality rates, individuals at elevated risk might either succumb to or recover from the virus earlier, thus reducing subsequent expected mortality rates.24

Our findings have several policy implications. First, many European countries as of 2024 have yet to resume the typical pattern of mortality decline that characterized the last century of progress. The resumption of a postpandemic mortality decline in Greece, Latvia, and Poland plausibly may be driven primarily by the displaced timing of deaths of at-risk individuals, especially older adults in countries with high mortality, and may reflect a return to prepandemic trajectories rather than substantive improvements beyond the 2015 to 2019 downtrend. Pandemic management policies must prioritize protecting high-risk populations through comprehensive, population-wide measures, as targeted shielding alone was insufficient. In parallel, integrating retrospective analyses of age-specific excess mortality into routine surveillance frameworks may help detect potential mortality displacement. While real-time monitoring may be limited by data lags, periodic assessment of cumulative excess deaths across age groups, especially among older adults, may inform evaluations of recovery and health system resilience. Finally, future research should aim to disentangle temporary mortality displacement from genuine recovery, ensuring that public health strategies are based on an accurate understanding of a pandemic’s impact and ongoing vulnerabilities.

Strengths and Limitations

Few studies, to our knowledge, have explicitly quantified mortality displacement after COVID-19 across such a large set of countries and demographic groups, making this a unique contribution to understanding postpandemic dynamics. A key strength of this study is its comprehensive inclusion of 34 countries with high-quality data, stratified by age, sex, and mortality quintile, which enabled the detection of heterogeneous patterns that would be masked in aggregate analyses. The use of nationally reported data, subjected to rigorous quality checks, with standardized formats, longitudinal and cross-country comparability, and detailed survival data at the oldest ages further enhanced the study’s external validity and generalizability.

This study has several limitations. First, despite using harmonized and validated national data, reporting quality and completeness may vary across countries, potentially introducing bias. Second, our analysis was ecological and based on aggregated age-group and country-level data, which limits our ability to adjust for individual-level factors such as comorbidities, socioeconomic status, or vaccination status, and raises the possibility of an ecologic fallacy; that is, inferences made about individuals from group-level data may not hold at the individual level. Third, demographic dynamics during and after the pandemic, such as selective migration of older adults, shifts in the age distribution, or differential survival of frail individuals, may vary across countries and age groups and could generate patterns that resemble mortality displacement even in the absence of true mortality displacement. Fourthly, while our study quantifies the association of mortality displacement with postpandemic mortality declines and underscores the importance of considering the mortality displacement when interpreting mortality trends after 2020, it does not fully disentangle this temporary outcome from longer-term recovery associated with other factors such as vaccination, health care improvements, and socioeconomic recovery. In addition, the observational nature of the study precludes causal inference, and findings should be interpreted in light of these constraints.

The findings of this cross-sectional study suggest that 31 of 34 countries with high-quality mortality data exhibited no statistically significant evidence of mortality displacement. In contrast, for Greece, Latvia, and Poland, countries with above-average COVID-19 mortality, part of the postpandemic decline may reflect mortality displacement, particularly among the oldest age groups. However, the scale of early excess mortality far exceeded what displacement alone could make up for COVID-19. This underscores a widely seen failure of shielding strategies to adequately protect broadly defined individuals. Recognizing this distinction is essential for accurately interpreting postpandemic mortality trends and for designing policies that effectively safeguard broader populations without propagating the myth that older individuals who died in the COVID-19 era were already near death. Future research should further disentangle mortality displacement from genuine recovery to establish a clearer causal understanding of the factors driving postpandemic mortality trends, as well as unravel why so many European countries have failed to resume their pre–COVID-19 pattern of mortality decline.

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Article Information

Accepted for Publication: November 30, 2025.

Published: January 29, 2026. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025.55442

Open Access: This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY License. © 2026 Chen X et al. JAMA Network Open.

Corresponding Author: David Makram Bishai, MD, PhD, Director’s Office, G/F, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Patrick Manson Building (North Wing), 7 Sassoon Rd, Hong Kong SAR, China (dbishai@hku.hk).

Author Contributions: Prof Bishai had full access to all of the data in the study and takes responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis.

Concept and design: Bishai.

Acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data: Chen, Ye, Cowling.

Drafting of the manuscript: Chen, Ye.

Critical review of the manuscript for important intellectual content: Chen, Cowling, Bishai.

Statistical analysis: Chen, Bishai.

Obtained funding: Bishai.

Administrative, technical, or material support: Chen, Bishai.

Supervision: Bishai.

Conflict of Interest Disclosures: Prof Cowling reported being a consultant for AstraZeneca, Fosun Pharma, GlaxoSmithKline, Haleon, Moderna, Novavax, Pfizer, Roche, and Sanofi Pasteur. No other disclosures were reported.

Funding/Support: This study is partly supported by HKU Daniel and Mayce Yu Medical Development Fund (No. 200010837).

Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The funder had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication.

Data Sharing Statement: See Supplement 2.

3.

Aburto  JM, Schöley  J, Kashnitsky  I,  et al.  Quantifying impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic through life-expectancy losses: a population-level study of 29 countries.   Int J Epidemiol. 2022;51(1):63-74. doi:10.1093/ije/dyab207PubMedGoogle ScholarCrossref

19.

Islam  N, Shkolnikov  VM, Acosta  RJ,  et al.  Excess deaths associated with covid-19 pandemic in 2020: age and sex disaggregated time series analysis in 29 high income countries.   BMJ. 2021;373(1137):n1137. doi:10.1136/bmj.n1137PubMedGoogle ScholarCrossref

32.

Caillon  A, Zhao  K, Klein  KO,  et al.  High systolic blood pressure at hospital admission is an important risk factor in models predicting outcome of COVID-19 patients.   Am J Hypertens. 2021;34(3):282-290. doi:10.1093/ajh/hpaa225PubMedGoogle ScholarCrossref

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(1) Chartbook 432 "Writing column. Talking w peril" - polycrisis or stroke?

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Why do people, more specifically, rich, famous and powerful men, do the things they do?

Money, power, fame, sex, form a fungible flux.

But in what configurations do these impulses circulate? How are they organized and contained? What inner demons and desires drive them?

The deranging thing about the Epstein revelations, is how utterly disinhibited that flux can become.

It brings us back hard to what we actually mean when we talk about “polycrisis” or “rupture”.

Are such terms hard enough for what we are actually witnessing? What is actually going on?

In 2022, the FT declared polycrisis to be one of the words of the year.

For some people it was a call for a new and more complicated social-scientific model.

For others it was the opposite. Not a new model but an acknowledgement of the fact that none of the familiar models were working. The phrase pointed to a “knowledge crisis”.

To my surprise the most prominent person to endorse this more radical reading was none other than Larry Summers, in conversation with Martin Wolf.

At least publicly, what we were talking about back then were big social structural forces. These, after all, were the polite days of 2022.

Even at the time, critics suggested that the popularity of the concept of polycrisis was a symptom of “neoliberal order breakdown syndrome” (NOBS).

After the Epstein revelations and the reaction or non-reaction to them, we clearly do need a deeper motivational analysis, not to say therapeutic or even psychiatric evaluation.

Berlusconi - the anti-hero of the Bungaboys - would not even attend an Epstein party. He wasn’t into “pizza” and “grape juice”. He preferred better wine and food and less kidnapping.

Our end of the end of history is worse.

Mark Carney in his speech at Davos called on people to recognize hypocrisy and double standards that had always underpinned the talk of a “rules-based international order”.

We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim. This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes. So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality. This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.

The “liberal international order” was not the only sign that we placed in the shop window of the Western world.

Rights. Decency. Respect for basic societal taboos. These were things that we claimed too.

At an even more elementary level, we claimed to be able to discriminate, to tell the difference between “good guys” and “bad guys”.

What the Epstein material reveals is not just the extent to which many figures of the establishment were involved in his world of sordid sex, but also their promiscuous mixing across political boundaries, the blurring of supposedly opposite positions.

In Epstein’s network the seemingly sharp lines between the liberal establishment - Clinton, Gates, Summers, Chomsky etc - and the supposed agents of polycrisis - the Russians, the Israelis, Trump and his cronies - were blurred.

There were no crisp lines of decorum. No one and nothing was beyond reach. Everything was up for grabs, whether that be “Snow White” or insider tips on the Eurozone crisis, bitcoin and Ukraine.

So when Summers talks about polycrisis what is he actually seeing?

Reading the Epstein correspondence from the first Trump term, both NOBS and polycrisis fall so far short. They, after all, imply some serious underlying commitments to the status quo. Some “rupture”.

Whereas what we are actually glimpsing through the released emails and txts are the slightly more cogent participants at a messy, dark, orgy watching from within their own derangement the worst of all take power.

Friday November 30 2018 - Monday December 3 2018.

As I realized with a shock, the most intensively reported exchange between Epstein and Larry Summers took place in November-December 2018, precisely the moment that Summers wrote a piece in the Washington Post that I have always thought of as one of the most insightful pieces on US-China relations of its era.

That exchange with Epstein was on Friday, presumably about Thursday night.

The WaPo piece came out on Monday, presumably finalized over the weekend.

That Wapo piece is dear to me. As much as an op ed piece can be.

If memory serves it came up again with Ezra Klein last week, though it does not seem to have made it into the transcript. It certainly did with Kaiser Kuo.

I keep coming back to it because as cogently as anyone has in Washington it poses the question: “Can the US live with the rise of China?”

“Can the United States imagine a viable system in years to come in which it is diminished to half the size of China, the world leader? Could a political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?”

These are prescient and vital questions from Summers.

What difference does it make to realize the context in which this piece was composed?

For most people, the energy of writing comes from strange places. We would not want someone looking over our shoulder.

But, in this case the shocking thing is not that Summers had smart ideas while he was involved in locker room chat with a sex offender about a problematic love interest.

The shock is to realize the extent to which the language of the Washington Post piece resonates with Summers’ language in discussing his love life with Epstein.

In a bad dream you could see the Washington Post piece and the Epstein texts blurring into a single uninterrupted flow:

“Can anything hold back the ”yellow peril”? How do I contain my attraction? How do we get to a rational affair?”

“ I like relationships without drama”

We “require a viable strategy for addressing our legitimate grievances. Unfortunately, neither rage nor proclamation constitutes such a strategy. A viable approach would involve feasible objectives clearly conveyed and supported by carrots and sticks, along with a willingness to define and accept success.”

“Has she become nationalistic? Would not surprise me”

“goes back to family priority. Community . And you suffer the imprimatur of being part of the enemy hierarchy”

“It appears fate has weighed in”

“More exploitation by peril. Should I stop calling? As she is in china. i have no idea what is real.”

“meet fickle with fickle”

“Guess tough and mean is sexier”

“I gave you a chance you blew it off. I get it. It took me awhile because I had such strong feelings. But it is sinking in”

“Can the United States/Summers/West imagine a viable system in years to come in which it is diminished to half the size of China, the world leader?”

“Could a political leader/Summers/the West acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?”

“Admitting she is not secure. Will take some probing. She is admitting weakness.”

“While it might be unacceptable to the United States/Summers/The West to be so greatly surpassed in economic scale, does it have the means to stop it? Can China be held down without inviting conflict?”

“she thinks she is a soldier at war. No soldier wants to be called cute”

“We are in a long game. Lets see how and if she starts to wonder”

“I would discount any comment re Eg tienaman. But I think current signal … is genuine.”

“I’m not so sure that being mentored by me, having me support her child, being elevated to a leader on China in global economy by collaborating with me and getting to have me as partner if she can find courage to tell her parents is really so useless.”

“How about asking ? What would you need to feel secure?”

“While it might be unacceptable to the United States to be so greatly surpassed in economic scale, does it have the means to stop it?”

“i think the china trade conflict has a major effect. . i have spoken to many of my chinese contacts in different places. and its all weird. .”

“whatever sense of humor they used to fake is gone.”

“These are hard questions without obvious answers. But that is no excuse for ignoring them and focusing only on short-run frustrations.”

“Btw, do you know many that are not self absorbed?”

“Has she asked you to come out and write what a bad idea attacking china is?”

“is she spooked after the pseudo recruitment event?”

“A bit. She listened to me a bit and commented yesterday that the folk called her office”

“it will definitely take a face to face to figure out. hopefully horizontal”

“The hook is in”

“Suppose China had been fully compliant…”

“Hope springs eternal”

“China appears to be willing to accommodate Summers/United States on specific trade issues/matters of (commercial) intercourse as long as the United States accepts its right to flourish and grow,…”

“I predict she will only be interested in discussing Chinese economy. Having admitted vulnerability she will now need to deny”

“Strategy working as predicted.“

“That is a deal the United States/Summers/TheWest should take while it can. It can bluster but it cannot, in an open world, suppress China. Trying to do so risks strengthening the most anti-American elements in Beijing.”

“Trump, for all his failings, has China’s attention on economic issues in a way that eluded his predecessors. The question is whether he will be able to use his leverage to accomplish something important. That will depend on his ability to convince the Chinese that the United States is capable of taking yes for an answer, and on his willingness to go beyond small-bore commercialism”

Why are you up so late?

Writing column. Talking w peril

It feels as though we are inside a surreal live reenactment of Joan Scott’s canonical essay on gender as a useful category of analysis.

“A rational affair?”

Is that not exactly what we want too want?

That certainly is what Europeans were craving at Davos.

It is what Carney proposed. Start with honesty. No more hypocrisy. Variable geometry. Wide not deep. The strength of our values and the value of our strength.

But set all that talk alongside the exchanges between Epstein and Larry Summers - Carney’s sometime analogue - and the doubt creeps in.

Are we, like Summers, fantasizing about stabilizing our desires and needs in an inherently dangerous and uncertain world? Are we kidding ourselves?

Does it lay us open, to Epstein’s swift counter:

“Did you had a stroke … ?”

What are you thinking? Don’t you understand? “Rational affairs” are not how the world works.

Not in love. Not in politics. Not in life.

Epstein’s quip was meant as a brutal put down. And Summers meekly retreated.

But, perhaps, rather than retreating, what if we roll with the punch?

Perhaps, Epstein’s jibe actually contains a truth. As does his follow on: “You are looking to her to fill too many of your needs. Without you being able to fill hers.”

Part of the devil’s attraction was clearly that, at least on some occasions, he gave sage advice.

Better than ChatGPT.

With all this material, someone must be training an Epstein algo.

We are in 2026 after all, this isn’t the warm up act of Trump’s first term.

At Davos Carney spoke of a “rupture, not a transition”.

And we lapped it up. He struck a bold note, befitting of a leader. But did he promise too much?

Was it too clean. Too composed?

Too much the cool, put-together guy at the orgy?

After the last few weeks are we really feeling composed?

A rupture, is sudden and disorientating. Are we really feeling it?

Not so much neoliberal order breakdown syndrome, as something closer to what Epstein described:

A stroke.

No wonder we have sweet dreams of “rational affairs” and “variable geometries”!

Our condition is actually serious.

Humiliating.

“Knowledge crisis”, indeed.

Rupture?

More like polycrisis as incontinence.

It will be a long road back. There is no getting over this.

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sarcozona
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Routine medical procedures can feel harder for women – here’s why

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Many women recognise the pattern. A routine procedure takes longer than expected. It’s more uncomfortable than promised. The doctor reassures them that this sometimes happens, or suggests anxiety or muscle tension might be playing a role. But often the explanation is simpler – and anatomical.

This mismatch between bodies and procedures isn’t related to rare conditions or specialist care. It reflects a recurring problem in everyday medicine. Many routine procedures were designed around male anatomy, and they don’t always work the same way on female bodies.

Take colonoscopy. It’s one of the most common investigations used to diagnose bowel disease and screen for cancer. Yet women are more likely than men to experience discomfort, require repositioning, or have an incomplete examination on the first attempt.

The reason lies in normal anatomy. On average, women have a longer and more mobile colon, particularly in the sigmoid segment that loops through the pelvis.

The female pelvis itself is broader and shallower, creating sharper angles as the bowel curves downward. These features make the scope more likely to bend and loop inside the bowel, slowing its progress and pulling on surrounding tissue – a major source of pain.

This isn’t abnormal anatomy. It’s normal anatomy that standard techniques don’t always take into account.

Urinary catheterisation is another routine procedure where anatomy matters. Although the urethra performs the same function in men and women, its length, course and anatomical context differ in ways that matter clinically.

In males, the urethra is long – around 18-22cm – and is usually described in three parts: the prostatic urethra, which is wide and fixed as it passes through the prostate; the membranous urethra, the narrowest segment as it crosses the pelvic floor; and the spongy (penile) urethra, which runs in a predictable course to a clearly identifiable external opening at the tip of the penis. Despite its length, the male urethra follows a stable path and ends at a prominent external landmark.

The female urethra is much shorter, usually about 3-4cm long, but lies within a more variable anatomical environment. From the bladder neck, it passes through the bladder wall and pelvic floor, before opening into the vulval vestibule at a meatus (the external opening of the urethra) closely related to the anterior vaginal wall.

Its position varies between individuals and across the life course, influenced by pelvic floor tone and hormonal status. In practice, this can make catheter insertion technically more difficult, increasing the likelihood of repeated attempts and discomfort – particularly in older women or those with atrophic tissue (thin, delicate tissue).

Lumbar puncture and spinal procedures show similar issues. Women tend to have a greater lumbar curve and different pelvic tilt, altering the angle at which a needle must pass between vertebrae. Mild spinal curvature is also more common in women. The procedure itself doesn’t change, but the geometry does, increasing the likelihood of multiple attempts and prolonged discomfort.

Model of a spine.

Women have a greater lumbar curve. Teeradej/Shutterstock.com

Even airway management, a cornerstone of anaesthesia and emergency medicine, reflects the same mismatch. Female airways are, on average, shorter and narrower. When equipment sizing and technique is based on a “standard” airway, women are more likely to experience sore throat and hoarseness afterward – effects often dismissed as minor, but rooted in anatomy rather than sensitivity.

Even something as commonplace as peripheral venous cannulation, the insertion of a small tube into a vein to deliver fluids, medications, or to take blood, reflects this mismatch. Women’s superficial veins are often smaller, less prominent and more mobile in soft tissue, making standard cannulation techniques more likely to result in repeated attempts, bruising and pain.

Design for variation, not exception

Doctors know bodies vary. In practice, many already adapt – choosing different patient positions, smaller instruments or altered techniques. But these adjustments are informal, inconsistently taught and rarely explained to patients.

Instead, difficulty is often bundled into vague categories: anxiety, tension, low pain tolerance or “one of those things”. The result is that women experience real, anatomy-driven discomfort without being told why, and may internalise it as a personal failing.

This matters. When discomfort is normalised or minimised, patients are less likely to return for screening, more likely to delay care, and more likely to mistrust reassurance that future procedures will be different.

None of this requires radical innovation. It requires naming the issue accurately. When procedures are taught and designed around a single reference body, predictable anatomical variation becomes an obstacle rather than a design feature.

Acknowledging that bodies differ – in length, curvature, mobility and spatial relationships – allows doctors to plan, explain and adapt more effectively.

Crucially, it also shifts the narrative. Instead of “this shouldn’t hurt”, the message becomes: “your anatomy means this procedure can be more challenging, and we’ll adjust it accordingly”.

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SpaceX Eyes 1 Million Satellites For Orbital Data Center Push

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SpaceX is requesting to launch up to one million satellites to create a network of orbiting data centers around Earth. 

Late on Friday, the company filed the request with the Federal Communications Commission, describing the project as a “constellation of satellites with unprecedented computing capacity to power advanced artificial intelligence (‘AI’) models and the applications that rely on them.”

The plan is shocking in its scope, dwarfing the existing Starlink constellation, which currently spans over 9,600 satellites in Earth’s orbit. 

In one 8-page document, SpaceX describes the company’s proposed “Orbital Data Center system.” “To deliver the compute capacity required for large scale AI inference and data center applications serving billions of users globally, SpaceX aims to deploy a system of up to one million satellites to operate within narrow orbital shells spanning up to 50 km each (leaving sufficient room to deconflict against other systems with comparable ambitions),” the company wrote. 

The document

(FCC/SpaceX)

The same satellites would harness the sun’s energy, orbiting at “between 500 km and 2,000 km altitude and 30 degrees and sun-synchronous orbit inclinations,” the company adds. The orbiting data centers would also use “optical links,” or lasers, to connect with Starlink, using the existing satellite internet system to route traffic to users below. 

“Orbital data centers are the most efficient way to meet the accelerating demand for AI computing power,” the filing adds in bold, pointing to the growing energy costs of AI data centers on Earth. The company is also betting it can launch the space-based data centers at a rapid clip using SpaceX’s more powerful Starship vehicle, which is also crucial to upgrading Starlink with next-generation satellites. 

The filing

(FCC/SpaceX)

The company filed the request as SpaceX is preparing an initial public offering reportedly to help fund the orbital data center push. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk has previously indicated his Starlink technology has already created a foundation to build out the network of orbiting data centers.

However, the 1 million satellite request appears to be unprecedented and will likely face intense scrutiny from the FCC, along with potential critics and rival companies. Earlier this month, the Commission cleared a SpaceX request to operate another 7,500 satellites for the second-generation Starlink constellation, including at lower orbits. But the regulator stopped short of granting permission for the full 22,488. 

Recommended by Our Editors

Details about SpaceX’s orbiting data centers, including their mass, were left vague. In the filing, SpaceX merely says that it “plans to design and operate different versions of satellite hardware to optimize operations across orbital shells.”

Satellite industry analyst Tim Farrar told PCMag: "This filing seems quite rushed and to be very early stage." But he said it provides a rationale for a reported merger between SpaceX and xAI, another Elon Musk company that was created to compete with OpenAI.

Farrar added: "SpaceX can't spend the $50B that the IPO is supposed to raise on its existing Starlink and Starship efforts, whereas xAI sorely needs as much money as possible to keep up with rivals."

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I've been a journalist for over 15 years. I got my start as a schools and cities reporter in Kansas City and joined PCMag in 2017, where I cover satellite internet services, cybersecurity, PC hardware, and more. I'm currently based in San Francisco, but previously spent over five years in China, covering the country's technology sector.

Since 2020, I've covered the launch and explosive growth of SpaceX's Starlink satellite internet service, writing 600+ stories on availability and feature launches, but also the regulatory battles over the expansion of satellite constellations, fights with rival providers like AST SpaceMobile and Amazon, and the effort to expand into satellite-based mobile service. I've combed through FCC filings for the latest news and driven to remote corners of California to test Starlink's cellular service.

I also cover cyber threats, from ransomware gangs to the emergence of AI-based malware. Earlier this year, the FTC forced Avast to pay consumers $16.5 million for secretly harvesting and selling their personal information to third-party clients, as revealed in my joint investigation with Motherboard.

I also cover the PC graphics card market. Pandemic-era shortages led me to camp out in front of a Best Buy to get an RTX 3000. I'm now following how President Trump's tariffs will affect the industry. I'm always eager to learn more, so please jump in the comments with feedback and send me tips.

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US judge rules Luigi Mangione won’t face death penalty in CEO killing case

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Judge rules out capital punishment, but 27-year-old still faces federal stalking charges and state-level murder charges.

A New York judge has dismissed murder and weapons charges against Luigi Mangione, meaning that prosecutors can no longer seek the death penalty in the case accusing him of killing UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson.

While district judge Margaret Garnett dismissed the charges punishable by death in her ruling on Friday, the 27-year-old still faces two counts of stalking in his federal case that could lead to a maximum punishment of life in prison, as well as state-level murder charges carrying the same penalty.

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Mangione, the Ivy League-educated scion of a wealthy Maryland family, previously pleaded not guilty to federal murder, weapons and stalking charges for allegedly gunning down Thompson in December 2024.

Garnett’s decision foils the bid of US President Donald Trump’s administration to see him executed for what it called a “premeditated, cold-blooded assassination that shocked America”. The judge is an appointee of former President Joe Biden.

Thompson, 50, was killed as he walked to a midtown Manhattan hotel for UnitedHealth Group’s annual investor conference.

Surveillance video showed a masked gunman shooting him from behind, with police saying that “delay,” “deny” and “depose” were written on the ammunition, mimicking a phrase used to describe how insurers avoid paying claims.

Jury selection in the federal case is scheduled to begin on September 8.

The state trial hasn’t been scheduled yet, but Mangione had already entered separate not guilty pleas for murder, weapons and forgery charges in Manhattan state court.

This week, the Manhattan district attorney’s office sent a letter urging the judge in that case to set a July 1 trial date.

Attorney General Pam Bondi ordered Manhattan federal prosecutors last April to seek the death penalty against Mangione, following through on Trump’s pledge to pursue capital punishment.

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Trump returned to office a year ago with a pledge to resume federal executions after they were halted under Biden.

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sarcozona
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Best gas masks | The Verge

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I was tear gassed by the government for the first time in July 2020 at one of the many Black Lives Matter protests that broke out all over the country. The feeling is excruciating, like your lungs are trying to kill you from the inside out. The sting in your eyes is painful, too. But oddly, after you’ve been tear gassed enough times, you mostly just resent the inconvenience of having to stand around and involuntarily gasp and sob. That summer, I learned the art of walking out of a cloud of tear gas — briskly, but not too briskly, lest you lose breath control and take in a huge huff of aerosolized pain.

I thought about this five years later, as I watched Trump Attorney General Pam Bondi appear on Fox News after Customs and Border Protection agents killed Alex Pretti in Minneapolis. “How did these people go out and get gas masks?” she asked, incredulously. “These protesters — would you know how to walk out on the street and buy a gas mask, right now? Think about that.”

As a longtime gas mask user, I can sympathize. There isn’t a lot of reliable information out there about how to buy a gas mask, especially for the specific purpose of living under state repression. But hopefully after reading this guide you’ll feel equipped to make an educated decision.

The best gas mask for most people

The Good

  • Full face
  • Blocks out tear gas from both federal and local law enforcement
  • Adjustable straps to fit a range of head sizes
  • Filters included
  • Affordable price point

The Bad

  • Rubber straps can tug on your hair
  • Plastic cinching components broke five years after purchase
  • Does not fit with most bike helmets
  • Difficult to wear for longer than an hour at a time
  • Unclear how well the default filters handle particulates

The first time I went out into the Portland protests, I walked into a cloud of pepper spray and ended up crying and coughing while doubled over on a nearby sidewalk. So I bought some goggles. The next time, I was tear gassed. I bought better goggles and a half-face respirator. About a week later, I owned a full-face gas mask; one ex-military friend remarked that the gas mask looked more hardcore than the ones that the US Army handed out to joes. This was just silly, since the mask I had bought was technically a full-face respirator, rather than a proper military-grade mask, but I had to admit that my new equipment looked very extreme.

Dozens of my fellow journalists were already on the ground by the time I got there; as the feds escalated in force, we all upgraded our equipment bit by bit. The mask I got was pretty good. I practiced taking it out of my bag and pulling it over my head, anticipating the moment I heard the telltale hiss of a gas canister; I learned how to tighten and adjust the straps while on the move. With the mask on, I could stand in the thick pea-soupers of brownish tear gas that the feds were so fond of, and pull out my phone and start tapping out my reporting notes.

When I eventually sat down to write my article about the Portland protests, I had a strange kind of epiphany, if it can even be called that. Out in the real world, when drowning in tear gas and adrenaline, I only thought of the feds as an antagonistic, occupying force; later, in the confines of my home office, I found myself considering their perspective. But rather than adding nuance and clarity to the fucked-up warzone less than a mile from my apartment, I was more confused than ever.

What we’re looking for

Who we consulted

The Verge consulted journalists who covered the Portland protests in 2020, where federal and local forces regularly used tear gas against protesters over the course of four months.

Easy to use

It’s important for a gas mask to slide over your head quickly, even in a chaotic environment.

A comfortable fit and coverage

You may be wearing a gas mask for just a few minutes, or you may find yourself in the mask for several hours at a time. After testing against both federal and local law enforcement, we found that although a half-face respirator and goggles are better than nothing, they are not an adequate substitute for full-face coverage.

Durability

A quality gas mask should last through normal wear and tear, like getting beaten or thrown around by the police. The materials of a gas mask are especially important if a federal agent grabs you by your hair.

Value

The best gas masks run close to $400, which is not a price point that everyone can afford. Not everyone can shell out for the gold standard in gas masks, but fortunately there are still decent options for around $120.

Why did tear gas even exist? I wondered later, as I sat at my laptop to write my piece. As far as I could tell, all it did was make people angrier. If it neither killed nor neutralized, and merely hurt and enraged people, for what situation could it ever be appropriate? Why was it being used at all?

I struggled, too, with vocabulary. I was at my computer, trying to point to concrete proof to explain that the protests were protests rather than riots, but I found myself baffled as to what the hallmarks of a riot even were. I had thought that a crowd being tear gassed in the dead of night might be similar to a mosh pit at a concert, but riddled with fear instead of elation — a crowd pushing and shoving, overcome with heightened emotion. But I found that the people around me, even when they were screaming and throwing eggs and other produce at the feds, would apologize if they even slightly jostled me. I did worry about being trampled one time, while standing next to an underprepared television crew that had come without gas masks and kept panicking throughout the night. When did a gathering turn into a riot? Were riots even real?

I started polling my friends on whether they’d ever witnessed something they could describe indisputably as a riot. Everyone I knew had only ever seen clashes with the police that were disputed as protests, riots, or uprisings. There was only one outlier: a friend of a friend, a European who had once been caught up in a soccer riot. Tear gas had been deployed, and instead of exacerbating things, the tear gas had worked. The two supporters’ clubs had disengaged and dispersed.

This revelation had me reeling. I had spent my entire adult life thinking that riot cops existed to fight protesters, and although I had long been critical of police brutality, for some reason, I had come to accept that there were two sides to a conflict and that the police would be one of those sides. I had forgotten that there could ever be domestic conflicts where law enforcement were not themselves belligerents.

The best high-end gas mask

The Good

  • Full face with excellent coverage and filtering
  • Military-grade
  • Comfortable
  • Adjustable straps don’t drag on your hair
  • Durable enough to survive a scuffle with a right-wing extremist, even if the bones of your hand do not

The Bad

  • Expensive
  • Filters not included
  • Can be heavy if you run it with two filters
  • You look like a character in Fallout 4

Mira makes the best masks that money can buy. Sergio Olmos, who has reported from both Portland and Ukraine, swears by Mira’s CM-6M specifically. Robert Evans of the Behind the Bastards podcast owns multiple Mira products and recommends all of them. His military-grade mask, he says, allows him to breathe while standing in “clouds of tear gas so thick I couldn’t see my hand in front of my face.” He also sometimes uses a Mira respirator. During a street brawl between hundreds of Portland leftists and right-wing agitators, Evans was “soaked to my underpants in mace” used by the right-wingers. “But thanks to the full face respirator I was never blinded nor was my airway constricted.”

I kept the gas mask long after I had filed my draft and the piece had run. It still got some use now and then, but as the protests petered out, I eventually put the gas mask on my bookshelf as a memento of a surreal era, and as a reminder that fascism lurked just beneath the surface of American civic life.

The longer I wear the gas mask, the more the rubber seal presses against my skin. When it’s tight, it’s uncomfortable; when it’s loose, it slowly drags down and chafes the skin. I hate that you have to lean in real close in order to talk to people; I hate the vague sensation of being trapped inside a fishbowl. I also strongly suspect that the mask is not adequate protection against the particulates in tear gas from a health standpoint — I didn’t have a normal period for six months after the 2020 protests.

But even if the mask wasn’t handling all of the particulates, I was pain-free while wearing the mask, and that was the most important part in a chaotic, low-visibility situation where I had a job to do. My body still remembers what it feels like to get tear gassed, and even the sight of a deployed smoke grenade will make me tense up. I have never coughed, cried, or thrown up while wearing the gas mask. In 2025, I took the gas mask off my shelf. It now resides in my reporting bag. Its presence there is reassuring; I know I can do my work even when trapped in a chemical haze.

Also a great choice

The Good

  • Full face
  • 3M manufactures a variety of filters

The Bad

  • Filters have to be bought separately
  • 3M does not provide product information on which filters are best for government repression
  • No one can hear anything you’re saying

Over the course of 2020, Suzette Smith (currently Portland Mercury) tried swimming goggles, “ski goggles with duct tape over them,” and other options before a reader gifted her a 3M 6800 Full-Face Respirator. “I’ve relied on those ever since,” she tells The Verge. Zane Sparling (The Oregonian) also uses a full-face 3M, which he says was the first option he found when he searched Amazon.

For a while, it felt like the world had forgotten about what happened in Portland in 2020, that this cataclysmic event over the course of four months that left so many of my peers battered both physically and emotionally had been memory-holed for being too heavy to grapple with. But as the feds surged into Minnesota, orchestrating an invasion bigger by several orders of magnitude, I realized that the past was not dead and buried. I could see the legacy of 2020 in photos from Minneapolis — the unmarked vans, the ICE agents dressed like right-wing militias, the protesters in gas masks and helmets. Even phone calls from other reporters asking what kind of gear I owned was a reminder that nothing is truly in vain.

The 2020 federal invasion of Portland ended with DHS withdrawing from the city — not because the protesters breached the walls or killed the feds or captured the castle, but because the protests simply refused to subside.

No matter how much tear gas the feds flooded into downtown, the crowds got bigger, not smaller. When the news of the van abductions spread, the protests swelled with people who looked like they belonged at an HOA meeting, rather than shoulder-to-shoulder with black bloc anarchists. Eventually, thousands would throng the park blocks in front of the downtown federal courthouse.

This was not a case of fans of rival football clubs getting too drunk and rowdy and then coming to their senses after a little jolt of weaponized capsaicin. Portland donned its gas mask and stood its ground.

As we’ve learned in the last year, Portland is far from unique. Cities across America have shown resilience and courage in the face of sudden abductions, unmarked vans, and masked agents. We do not have time to heave, cough, or weep — so we pull on our gas masks and walk forward into the mist.

What is tear gas for? It is for inciting riots. How did people go out and get gas masks? They ordered them online, because they do not want to riot.

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rocketo
5 days ago
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"A quality gas mask should last through normal wear and tear, like getting beaten or thrown around by the police. The materials of a gas mask are especially important if a federal agent grabs you by your hair."

one of those articles that just perfectly encapsulates the age it's written in
seattle, wa
acdha
5 days ago
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“I had forgotten that there could ever be domestic conflicts where law enforcement were not themselves belligerents.”
Washington, DC
sarcozona
6 days ago
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Epiphyte City
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