‘I will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness.’ These words, already deemed historic, were uttered by the US President only a few hours after he landed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Cheers drowned out the rest, as the Saudi Crown Prince and the attending guests gave Donald Trump a standing ovation. That same night spontaneous celebrations erupted in the streets of Damascus and other Syrian cities. The ending of the US sanctions imposed on the former Assad regime is the most important event since the fall of the bloodthirsty dictator. For over 20 million Syrians, however, above all this means hope for a better future. Without the lifting of sanctions, there could be no chance of national reconstruction and economic revival and thus no prospects for the impoverished and war-ravaged population.

This is a game-changer of the kind we’ve become familiar with from Trump. It came totally out of the blue. The first rumours emerged only shortly before the actual announcement. The US sanctions, largely contained in the so-called Caesar Act, were the most comprehensive and oppressive measures ever imposed on a country. Politically, however, there was little to show for them. The fall of the Assad regime in December last year owed less to the economic sanctions than to the military boldness of the Islamic HTS rebels and the regime’s ideological exhaustion. Scarcely a shot was fired at the rapidly advancing fighters — the dictatorship collapsed in on itself like a soufflé. Nor was it a popular uprising that brought down the regime. Its downfall was not a direct result of the economic hardship the sanctions imposed on the population.

Trump’s U-turn

From December onwards, it was above all the Europeans – and primarily Germany – who were urging an end to the sanctions. Initially, however, there was little hope that the Americans would get on board. A number of factors were against it. First of all, it was unclear what Syria policy the United States was pursuing. Most of those responsible for Syria and experts on the country had been dismissed in the ‘purges’ of actual and alleged Biden officials. Furthermore, the new Syrian regime seemed to be the embodiment of everything MAGA America professes to be against.

An America proclaiming itself to be embroiled in an ideological war with Islam was highly unlikely to reach out to a government that included alleged Jihadis. To make matters worse, in March the Alawi minority on the Syrian coast was subjected to a series of attacks. MAGA circles eagerly leapt on them as alleged massacres of Christians. Worst of all, however, is likely to have been Israeli propaganda, which depicted transitional president Ahmed al-Sharaa as an irredeemable religious warrior who wants to annihilate religious minorities, while the Jewish state set itself up as their protector.

The Netanyahu government, as it turns out, is the biggest loser from Trump’s about-turn. Israel’s aim is to keep a lid on the new Syria. Massive bombardments, the invasion of parts of southern Syria in defiance of international law and the deliberate incitement of religious divisions are all part of an Israeli policy aimed at destabilising their neighbour.

The ceasefire with the Houthis, the resumption of nuclear negotiations with Tehran – and now the lifting of sanctions against Syria – are clearly all happening against Netanyahu’s stated will.

This was despite the fact that the new rulers in Damascus were clearly holding out an olive branch. It was made evident early on that Damascus had no interest whatever in clashing with Tel Aviv. President Sharaa kept calm even in the face of repeated Israeli air strikes. The new government’s rhetoric also maintained a restrained note, even as popular anger boiled over in the south of the country against the naked aggression. What’s more, further concessions were offered through US intermediaries, including de facto acknowledgement of Israeli control of the Golan Heights. But it all fell on deaf ears in Israel.

In Washington, by contrast, the smart diplomacy of Syria’s transitional government seemed to strike a chord. It may be that this indicates a fundamental reorientation of US policy in the Middle East. Under the weak Biden presidency at times it was unclear who the superpower was in US–Israeli relations.

In the wake of Trump’s re-election, there were fears that Washington had finally outsourced its Middle Eastern policy to Tel Aviv, in the sense of ‘make the Middle East safe for Israel’. Things appear to have turned out differently, however. For all his erratic behaviour, transactionalism dominates over pure ideology under Trump.

In the ideological trench warfare within the MAGA camp, the extremely pro-Israel, neoconservative party seems to be losing out to those hostile to foreign intervention. They see an increasingly aggressive Israel as more of a security burden than a strategic partner. The fact is that Tel Aviv is continuing to push its luck, seemingly safe in the knowledge that its big brother in Washington, with its aircraft carriers and stealth bombers, will make sure that it never has to pay the price.

The ceasefire with the Houthis, the resumption of nuclear negotiations with Tehran – and now the lifting of sanctions against Syria – are clearly all happening against Netanyahu’s stated will. On its own, it’s unlikely the Syrian government could have managed to persuade Trump to make this game-changing move. The key factor was rather the strongest advocates on behalf of Sharaa, above all Turkish President Erdoğan. The fall of Assad is undoubtedly one of the greatest foreign policy successes of his already geopolitically ambitious agenda.

Saudi Arabia’s role

But even more significant was the support of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). This is all the more remarkable because under his leadership Saudi Arabia is pursuing a strictly anti-Islamist course. It is not in the interests of Riyadh or the axis of so-called ‘moderate Arabs’ in Cairo, Amman and Abu Dhabi – who have explicitly positioned themselves against the Muslim Brotherhood – for an Islamist-led regime in Damascus to succeed.

Against this background, Sharaa’s first trip abroad in early February – not to Turkey, but straight to Riyadh – was all the more revealing. And indeed, he appears to have convinced MBS that the new government in Damascus poses no ideological threat.

Perhaps Riyadh will succeed where the West has failed for decades: in taming Iranian Islamists, at least in terms of regional politics.

Taking ideology out of foreign relations is entirely in line with the Saudi Crown Prince’s approach. In the wake of the Arab Spring and its failed popular uprisings, the Arab world was shaken by hegemonic struggles and ideological conflicts that plunged entire countries, not least Syria, into chaos. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran were each vying for regional supremacy.

There were signs of an approaching détente in the Middle East even before the events of 7 October. They culminated in a rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran. Indeed, despite all the tensions and setbacks, this dialogue is still ongoing. This development is in line with MBS’s vision: not the suppression of rivals, but mutual acceptance as a new regional paradigm. Key to this is a dawning realisation in Riyadh that the kingdom would be one of the main victims in the event of a war with Iran.

Riyadh is therefore holding Tehran close. Not out of naivety, but in an effort to coax the embattled but still far from powerless Islamic Republic onto the path of good neighbourly relations. Given its current fragility, it might be persuaded to cooperate.

Wiser heads in Tehran may certainly respond favourably to such a course, as a possible way out of the current impasse. Indeed, traditional anti-Saudi propaganda has almost completely fallen silent. Perhaps Riyadh will succeed where the West has failed for decades: in taming Iranian Islamists, at least in terms of regional politics.

What comes next?

But the biggest winner from Trump’s U-turn is undoubtedly Sharaa himself. His exceptionally prudent foreign policy has paid dividends. This diplomatic outreach has maintained consistency in every direction, in the case of Israel almost to the point of self-denial. It is a remarkable achievement, given the extremely complex geopolitical situation and the multitude of powerful opponents, who are not confined to Tel Aviv and Tehran. Such farsightedness is unusual. Generally speaking, revolutionary regimes are prone to let their ideological enthusiasm get the better of them. Sharaa, by contrast, has so far conspicuously refrained from any form of escalation.

The question nevertheless remains how credible his ideological turn can be. Many Syrians are asking themselves the same question. Could he really be a statesman concerned about all his fellow Syrians, regardless of their religion or worldview? Or does his statesmanlike façade mask an ideologically driven Jihadist, planning to turn Syria into an Islamic republic?

The lifting of US sanctions also boosts Sharaa’s domestic political legitimacy.

Of course, Syria can scarcely be expected to develop a full-blown democracy overnight. But there is no reason why a regime similar to Turkey’s should not emerge, supported by broad sections of the population, with a certain degree of political plurality and even liberal niches. Given the chaos, civil war and devastation that have shaken large parts of the Arab world in recent years, this would truly constitute a major step forward, notwithstanding all the justified criticism. However, whether this actually happens scarcely depends on Sharaa alone. It depends every bit as much on all those Syrians who not only hope for such a future, but are also actively demanding it.

The lifting of US sanctions also boosts Sharaa’s domestic political legitimacy. The upshot is that his government is no longer merely the force that toppled the dictator, but perhaps also the agent of reconstruction in this ravaged country. Billions in investments from the Gulf are standing at the ready; Turkish construction companies are waiting for the green light; and there are cautious signals of support even from the West. An economic reawakening could commence as early as tomorrow. Such an economic leap forward could also help to alleviate the numerous unresolved issues beleaguering the country.

But international pressure is hardly Sharaa’s only concern. He must also keep his own, partly jihadist-influenced followers under control. With a gentle but firm hand, he is trying to get them to undergo their own ‘road to Damascus’, namely to relinquish ideological violence, as recently manifested in attacks on Alawites and Druze. There is no guarantee that this will succeed. Such periods of upheaval are fraught with potential relapses. Syria is by no means home free. But by lifting sanctions – with all due reservations – Trump has brought a stable Syria one step closer.

I’m linking here to Techmeme’s roundup of news coverage and commentary, but I highly recommend you start by reading Gonzalez Rogers’s 80-page decision. It is excoriating. I’ve read few legal decisions quite like it. But it’s also incredibly cogent and plainly written.

From the start:

To summarize: One, after trial, the Court found that Apple’s 30 percent commission “allowed it to reap supracompetitive operating margins” and was not tied to the value of its intellectual property, and thus, was anticompetitive. Apple’s response: charge a 27 percent commission (again tied to nothing) on off-app purchases, where it had previously charged nothing, and extend the commission for a period of seven days after the consumer linked-out of the app. Apple’s goal: maintain its anticompetitive revenue stream. Two, the Court had prohibited Apple from denying developers the ability to communicate with, and direct consumers to, other purchasing mechanisms. Apple’s response: impose new barriers and new requirements to increase friction and increase breakage rates with full page “scare” screens, static URLs, and generic statements. Apple’s goal: to dissuade customer usage of alternative purchase opportunities and maintain its anticompetitive revenue stream. In the end, Apple sought to maintain a revenue stream worth billions in direct defiance of this Court’s Injunction.

There’s quite a bit of fury in those italics. Rule one when you’re in court, any court, is “Don’t piss off the judge.” Apple has absolutely infuriated Gonzales Rogers through actions that all of us saw as outrageous.

In stark contrast to Apple’s initial in-court testimony, contemporaneous business documents reveal that Apple knew exactly what it was doing and at every turn chose the most anticompetitive option. To hide the truth, Vice-President of Finance, Alex Roman, outright lied under oath. Internally, Phillip Schiller had advocated that Apple comply with the Injunction, but Tim Cook ignored Schiller and instead allowed Chief Financial Officer Luca Maestri and his finance team to convince him otherwise. Cook chose poorly. The real evidence, detailed herein, more than meets the clear and convincing standard to find a violation. The Court refers the matter to the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California to investigate whether criminal contempt proceedings are appropriate.

This is an injunction, not a negotiation. There are no do-overs once a party willfully disregards a court order. Time is of the essence. The Court will not tolerate further delays. As previously ordered, Apple will not impede competition. The Court enjoins Apple from implementing its new anticompetitive acts to avoid compliance with the Injunction. Effective immediately Apple will no longer impede developers’ ability to communicate with users nor will they levy or impose a new commission on off-app purchases.

You know a judge is pissed when she busts out the bold italics. Later, on (page 21, citations omitted for readability):

Prior to the June 20 meeting, there were individuals within Apple who were advocating for a commission, and others advocating for no commission. Those advocating for a commission included Mr. Maestri and Mr. Roman. Mr. Schiller disagreed. In an email, Mr. Schiller relayed that, with respect to the proposal for “a 27% commission for 24 hours,” “I have already explained my many issues with the commission concept,” and that “clearly I am not on team commission/fee.” Mr. Schiller testified that, at the time, he “had a question of whether we would be able to charge a commission” under the Injunction, a concern which he communicated.

Schiller comes across as Apple’s sole voice of reason, fairness, and dare I say honesty in this entire ruling. The only people in the world who seemed to think Apple could or should comply with the 2021 injunction (that apps be permitted to steer users to the web to make purchases) by charging a commission — any commission, let alone a 27 percent commission — on those web transactions were Apple’s finance team members, led by Luca Maestri and Alex Roman, and Tim Cook.

Unlike Mr. Maestri and Mr. Roman, Mr. Schiller sat through the entire underlying trial and actually read the entire 180-page decision. That Messrs. Maestri and Roman did neither, does not shield Apple of its knowledge (actual and constructive) of the Court’s findings.

I mean Jesus H. Christ, that’s scathing.

It’s worth pointing out that Luca Maestri is no longer Apple’s CFO. (Kevan Parekh is.) Back in August, Apple announced that Maestri was, effectively retiring as CFO “as part of a planned succession”. Apple’s statement didn’t use the word retiring, but rather the word transitioning. With this ruling and Maestri’s central role in Apple’s decision to forge ahead with a compliance plan where they “allowed” steering to the web by charging the same effective commissions on web transactions as they do for in-app transactions, I now have to wonder whether Maestri retired or “retired”. “Cook chose poorly” (by following Maestri’s recommendation) is not the sort of sentence from a judge that keeps CFOs in their jobs.

As for Alex Roman, I think he’s in some serious trouble. Like doing-time-in-the-clink trouble:

Despite its own considerable evaluation, during the first May 2024 hearing, Apple employees attempted to mislead the Court by testifying that the decision to impose a commission was grounded in AG’s report. The testimony of Mr. Roman, Vice President of Finance, was replete with misdirection and outright lies. He even went so far as to testify that Apple did not look at comparables to estimate the costs of alternative payment solutions that developers would need to procure to facilitate linked-out purchases.

The Court finds that Apple did consider the external costs developers faced when utilizing alternative payment solutions for linked out transactions, which conveniently exceeded the 3% discount Apple ultimately decided to provide by a safe margin. Apple did not rely on a substantiated bottoms-up analysis during its months-long assessment of whether to impose a commission, seemingly justifying its decision after the fact with the AG’s report.

Mr. Roman did not stop there, however. He also testified that up until January 16, 2024, Apple had no idea what fee it would impose on linked-out purchases:

Q. And I take it that Apple decided to impose a 27 percent fee on linked purchases prior to January 16, 2024, correct?

A. The decision was made that day.

Q. It’s your testimony that up until January 16, 2024, Apple had no idea what — what fee it’s going to impose on linked purchases?

A. That is correct.

Another lie under oath: contemporaneous business documents reveal that on the contrary, the main components of Apple’s plan, including the 27% commission, were determined in July 2023.

Neither Apple, nor its counsel, corrected the, now obvious, lies. They did not seek to withdraw the testimony or to have it stricken (although Apple did request that the Court strike other testimony). Thus, Apple will be held to have adopted the lies and misrepresentations to this Court.

There’s so much more. The whole ruling is compelling — and damning — reading.

Keep in mind this whole thing stems from an injunction from a lawsuit filed by Epic Games that Apple largely won. The result of that lawsuit was basically, “OK, Apple wins, Epic loses, but this whole thing where apps in the App Store aren’t allowed to inform users of offers available outside the App Store, or send them to such offers on the web (outside the app) via easily tappable links, is bullshit and needs to stop. If the App Store is not anticompetitive it should be able to compete with links to the web and offers from outside the App Store.”

Are the results of this disastrous for Apple’s App Store business? I don’t think so at all. Gonzales Rogers is demanding that Apple ... do what Phil Schiller recommended they do all along, which is to compete fair and square with purchases available on the web. She’s not demanding they do what, say, Tim Sweeney wanted them to do. She’s basically saying Phil Schiller was right. Read her entire ruling and it’s hard to imagine anyone disagreeing with that.

But are the results of this disastrous for Apple’s reputation and credibility? It sure seems like it. But it would be worse — much worse — for Apple’s reputation if Phil Schiller weren’t still there. Without him, this ruling makes it sound like they’d be lost, both ethically and legally.

I’ll give the final words to Gonzales Rogers’s own closing:

Apple willfully chose not to comply with this Court’s Injunction. It did so with the express intent to create new anticompetitive barriers which would, by design and in effect, maintain a valued revenue stream; a revenue stream previously found to be anticompetitive. That it thought this Court would tolerate such insubordination was a gross miscalculation. As always, the cover-up made it worse. For this Court, there is no second bite at the apple.

It Is So Ordered.

New academic standards in Oklahoma call for the teaching of "discrepancies" in the 2020 election, continuing the spread of a false narrative years after it was first pushed by Trump and his allies.

(Image credit: Sue Ogrocki)