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An Oil Price-Fixing Conspiracy Caused 27% of All Inflation Increases in 2021

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Welcome to BIG, a newsletter on the politics of monopoly power. If you’d like to sign up to receive issues over email, you can do so here.

I’m at the Google antitrust closing arguments, and I’ll have some thoughts on that soon. But today’s piece is about some bombshell evidence that just came out on a giant post-Covid conspiracy in the oil industry. And I do mean giant, because there’s now evidence that price-fixingp in the oil industry alone may single-handedly be responsible for a little over a quarter of the total inflationary increase in 2021.

Let’s dive in.

Last Sunday, I wrote a piece alleging that U.S. shale oil producers colluded with the Saudi government from 2021-2023 to drive up gas prices. That essay was based on some reporting I had done, as well as a complaint from a savvy Kansas City class action law firm, Sharp Law, with special expertise in oil. The theory was that American producers, after a bitter price war from 2014-2016, got tired of competing on price with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or the OPEC oil cartel, and at some point from 2017-2021, decided to join the cartel and cut supply to the market. This action had the affect of raising oil prices, costing oil consumers something on the order of $200 billion a year.

Yesterday, the Federal Trade Commission released evidence confirming that collusion played a serious role in hiking oil prices at that time. Pioneer Natural Resources CEO Scott Sheffield, a leader in the fracking field, “exchanged hundreds of text messages with OPEC representatives and officials discussing crude oil market dynamics, pricing and output.” Sheffield was explicit about his goal, saying that “if Texas leads the way, maybe we can get OPEC to cut production. Maybe Saudi and Russia will follow. That was our plan,” he said, adding: “I was using the tactics of OPEC+ to get a bigger OPEC+ done.” He talked to shareholders, publicly threatened rivals, and ultimately achieved output cuts across the industry regardless of price. “Even if oil gets to $200/barrel,” he said, “the independent producers are going to be disciplined.”

By 2021, as the economy roared back from Covid, the independents had joined OPEC. “I don’t think the world can rely much on US shale,” Sheffield said. “It’s really under OPEC control.”

There’s more about Sheffield in the FTC complaint, though a lot is redacted. Investment data bears out what the FTC found, with lower production despite variations in price.

How much did this conspiracy cost the consumer? “We produced too much oil and competed with OPEC,” Sheffield said in 2023. “We actually lowered the price by $20 to $30 per barrel over the past 10 years to the detriment of losing our entire investor base.”

Since the U.S. consumes 7 billion barrels of oil annually, the amount saved by shale oil drillers during their price war with OPEC was $140 billion to $210 billion a year. Once that price war ended, presumably so did the savings. The cost itself is likely a lot higher because pulling shale off the market when demand spiked probably caused prices to increase by much more than $20-30 a barrel. Anyway, we’re talking $500-1000 dollars of extra cost per year to Americans through direct and indirect effects of this conspiracy. This cost shows up most obviously in the form of more expensive gas, but higher oil prices increase the price of everything right down to potato chips because of gas being a primary cost in distribution of goods and services. For a family of four, that’s two to four thousand dollars a year in higher costs.

With these kinds of numbers, it’s likely this conspiracy had macro-economic impacts. In late 2021, I noticed that the increase in corporate profits in aggregate was responsible for 60% of inflationary increases, using this chart and doing a bunch of rough calculations that have since mostly been borne out. The jump in profits in 2021 was about $730 billion, or $2,100 per person.

How do you aggregate just the oil industry? Well, it’s pretty clear that in 2021 and 2022, the industry did fantastically well, with the “the top 25 companies [making] more than $205 billion in profits in 2021,” and an “even more astounding” amount in 2022. Of course, not all profits are due to price-fixing, but $205 billion is just the top 25, not the whole industry. And profits got much much better the next year.

So let’s layer on a rough guess of a $200 billion increase in profits in 2021 that Scott Sheffield implies, which is 27% of the total corporate profit increase that year. That’s a pretty astounding amount, more than a quarter of the total inflationary increase being a result purely of a price-fixing scheme.

In 2021-2022, many populists questioned whether oil companies were engaging in a conspiracy, which triggered intense pushback from economists like Larry Summers that market power as a cause of inflation is a silly theory, and that we needed a recession and cuts to government spending to bring down prices. Remember this comment?

As it turned out, populists were right about corporate profits as a factor in inflation. And now we can see that it’s price-fixing in the specific sector of oil companies that kept prices high.

Ok, so now let’s talk about why the government uncovered this conspiracy, and what is likely to happen. The context for this investigation was the FTC looking into the $60 billion Exxon-Pioneer merger. And while the FTC did let the merger through, they conditioned it on Exxon disallowing Sheffield from serving on the board of the combined firm or having a role as an advisor after it acquires his company. It’s a pretty aggressive punishment for an executive, to essentially bar him from the corporation he helped build. The industry, especially in the executive suite, is apparently shaken.

Still, the FTC allowed the Exxon-Pioneer merger through, probably because the case would be brought in Texas, the industry is generally supportive of oil mergers, and it’s hard to argue to a judge that a merger would grant market power over the price of oil when the witnesses in the industry don’t support a challenge. The conduct the FTC found is a conspiracy that violates price-fixing law, and the commission should be bringing a charge on that basis, not necessarily based on merger law. Plaintiff lawyers are already bringing price-fixing claims here, and the FTC action just made that case far more likely to draw blood.

There’s also the politics, as these oil mergers are highly contested and partisan. Democrats are skeptical of “Big Oil,” while the Republican coalition is built around fossil fuel firms, Wall Street private equity who finance it, and Saudi wealth that benefits from expensive oil. Late last year, 21 Senate Democrats asked the FTC to challenge this spate of oil and gas mergers. Then, a few month ago, 37 Senate Republicans, led by Texas Senator Ted Cruz, sent a letter demanding the FTC stay out of the industry’s merger spree, as that merger spree would, in their view, raise production.

Within the commission, it was obviously a big deal. The settlement from the FTC kicking Sheffield off the board was a 3-2 commission vote that similarly broke down on party lines. FTC Chair Lina Khan, Commissioners Alvaro Bedoya and Rebecca Kelly Slaughter all issued separate statements, whereas Republicans Andrew Ferguson and Melissa Holyoak issued a joint dissent. Everyone agreed that the conduct of Sheffield was concerning, and Slaughter, Holyoak, and Ferguson called for a potential price-fixing suit.

Ferguson and Holyoak argued the merger itself was fine, and the board position had nothing to do with the combination. There was an odd bit where they lauded Exxon’s ‘wise’ decision to not put Sheffield on the board. Bedoya, in his statement, rebutted this by pointing out that Exxon was going to put Sheffield on its board until the FTC acted. Khan’s argument was simple; when executives say they are trying to collude, regulators should have ‘regulatory humility’ and believe them.

At any rate, this decision is a bit of a muddle. An oil CEO, a legend and decision-maker in the industry, got personally punished for price-fixing. That’s good. But a big merger went through, though it is relatively small in the global context. Still, the muddle is inherent, as there’s just no way to fix a harm that was so vast and far-reaching.

So what happens now? Well fortunately there already is a private antitrust price-fixing suit, and it just got a huge boost from the FTC’s release of its complaint. That means years of litigation against not just Pioneer but seven different shale oil producers. Additionally, the FTC could bring actual monopolization claims against the shale producers, but that’s probably contingent upon a second Biden term, an uncertain proposition. And even with that possibility, we’re going to run into the same problem we see with all of antitrust, which is that it takes forever.

Finally, there’s also likely to be some sort of political reaction, considering it’s an election year, and this is pretty good evidence that oil firms helped collude with Saudi Arabia to steal thousands of dollars from each American family. I can see Congressional proposals to fund oil-specific antitrust investigations, special rules proposed to prohibit communications with OPEC, or even pushing the Federal Reserve to start looking into the relationship between price-fixing and inflation. In 2022, the Biden administration pleaded with oil firms to invest in drilling more to bring down the price of oil, but they refused, claiming it was Biden environmental policies that were the cause of their low investment.

The environmental constraints bit was in retrospect an obvious lie. And even the war in Ukraine, it turns out, was likely just an excuse for what was really going on, which was price-fixing. Americans were skeptical of big oil, and their instincts were correct. It really was a conspiracy against us by a small group.

That said, even if all of these suits worked out, and the political proposals enacted, it wouldn’t be enough. There’s no way to make Americans whole for what oil executives did, but there needs to be a real penalty for schemes of this magnitude. What should happen is handcuffs, en masse, for every executive that set up the American branch of OPEC. Will that happen? I doubt it. But it should.

Regardless, macro-economists should stop ignoring the dynamics of specific markets. Reality, as it turns out, matters.

Thanks for reading! Your tips make this newsletter what it is, so please send me tips on weird monopolies, stories I’ve missed, or other thoughts. And if you liked this issue of BIG, you can sign up here for more issues, a newsletter on how to restore fair commerce, innovation, and democracy. Consider becoming a paying subscriber to support this work, or if you are a paying subscriber, giving a gift subscription to a friend, colleague, or family member. If you really liked it, read my book, Goliath: The 100-Year War Between Monopoly Power and Democracy.

cheers,

Matt Stoller

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sarcozona
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N.S. man stuck abroad due to lack of available hospital beds ‘in our own province’ | Globalnews.ca

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Cassie (@casseagull@mstdn.social)

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Canadian Housing Market Craziness

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Canadian Housing Market Craziness

So, the CBC is the the national broadcaster in Canada, similar to the BBC in Europe. They’re pretty stodgy, they run good radio programs and they are wary of the government, as you’d expect.

They just wrote a really good article in problems in the housing market.

The two graphs that really matter are:

But here’s what I find interesting. Quotes like this:

“What started happening in B.C. and spread throughout the country is that we weren’t just satisfied with paying off our mortgage to build equity. We’re like: ‘You know what? I want this home price to double, triple, quadruple.'”

When existing homeowners want prices to rise faster than earnings in the local economy “is the moment you want a wealth windfall for those who are owners now that will come, by definition mathematically, at the expense of affordability for those who follow,” Kershaw said.

“That’s the trouble we’ve gotten ourselves into. And if we cannot have that conversation, we will never solve the crisis of housing affordability.”

If housing is an investment; a way to get rich, then by definition it’s going to get expensive faster than most people’s income. This is common sense. It’s acknowledged in Japan, for example, but in North America we’re addicted to our free riches, and since most people are locked out of the other sources of unearned wealth, real-estate prices are politically off-limits, they’re supposed to go up faster than inflation and wages forever, and the government colludes to make it happen, including by guaranteeing mortgages and stepping in 2008 to limit the price crash.

Homeowners and home investors, after all, vote and donate to political parties.

Anyway, CBC is stodgy and politically wary, for it to allow an article saying that home owners aren’t saints and perhaps housing prices shouldn’t be allowed to float into the stratosphere is very interesting.

The technical solutions to fixing rent and housing prices are well known: if Japan, with way less land, fewer resources and far more people can keep housing affordable, obviously Canada can do it.

But we can’t do it political parties want housing prices to keep rising and rising because it make an important chunk of voters happy.

And lack of housing (aka. homelessness) and increased food prices are going to lead to political unrest if something isn’t done.

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Texas man files legal action to probe ex-partner’s out-of-state abortion - The Washington Post

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As soon as Collin Davis found out his ex-partner was planning to travel to Colorado to have an abortion in late February, the Texas man retained a high-powered antiabortion attorney — who court records show immediately issued a legal threat.

If the woman proceeded with the abortion, even in a state where the procedure remains legal, Davis would seek a full investigation into the circumstances surrounding the abortion and “pursue wrongful-death claims against anyone involved in the killing of his unborn child,” the lawyer wrote in a letter, according to records.

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An upper bound on one-to-one exposure to infectious human respiratory particles | PNAS

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Given these assumptions, the total absorbed dose by the susceptible individual can be calculated as follows:

[3]

where

[4]

and

,

d0

is the initial wet particle size on exhalation by the infectious,

is the shrinkage factor defined as the ratio of the particle initial wet diameter

d0

to the equilibrium diameter

de

after it is exposed to the typically subsaturated conditions of the room and has lost its volatile components,

and

are the minimum and maximum particle size that can be aerosolized and contain

k

copies of the pathogen,

texp

is the exposure duration of the susceptible individual,

ρp

is the pathogen number concentration, that is, the viral load, in the infectious respiratory tract fluid,

is the number concentration of exhaled particles at the mouth/nose of the infectious,

is the fractional ratio at which the particle concentration of the exhaled air by the infectious individual decreases until it reaches the breathing zone of the susceptible individual due to (turbulent and/or molecular) mixing with the room air or particle deposition losses,

is the outward filter penetration of the face mask fabric worn by the infectious,

is the outward face seal leakage of the face mask worn by the infected individual during exhalation,

and

are, respectively, the ratios of the exhale flow rate through the filter and face seal leaks to the total exhale flow rate of the infectious,

is the inward filter penetration of the face mask fabric worn by the susceptible,

is the inward face seal leakage of the face mask worn by the susceptible,

and

are, respectively, the ratios of the inhale flow rate through the filter and face seal leaks to the total inhale flow rate of the susceptible,

is the intake/deposition efficiency of the inhaled particles within the respiratory of the susceptible individual, and

and

are the volumetric inhalation rate (also called ventilation rate) of the infectious and susceptible, respectively. It should be noted that many of the parameters present in

Eq. 3

are also functions of the room conditions, for example, RH, temperature, ventilation type, air velocity, which are neglected here.

We assume that the

ρp

is constant and independent of the particle size, even though it has been shown that particles of different sizes have different production sites within the respiratory tract (

5

) and particles of different origins might have different viral loads (

74

). The SARS-CoV-2 viral load,

ρp

, is in the very broad range of 10

2

mL

−1

to 10

11

mL

−1

(

23

). Mean values for the currently measured SARS-CoV-2 variants are 10

8.2

mL

−1

to 10

8.5

mL

−1

(

75

). Here we use 10

8.5

mL

−1

to obtain an upper estimate on risk of infection, which should be more applicable to the new variants of SARS-CoV-2. The increase in viral load with the new variants currently circulating globally is constant with findings in other studies (e.g., see ref.

76

, and references therein). The SARS-CoV-2 ID

is not known very well, and, in the literature, a range of values between 100 and 1,000 is used, that is,

(

3

,

21

) and 100 (

26

). In this investigation, we assume ID

, which, for a fixed pathogen dose, gives a risk of infection that is, at most, half (or 2 times) the values calculated with ID

(or 400).

values are calculated based on the multimodal fits found by ref.

5

, which is obtained based on measurements from more than 130 subjects aged 5 y to 80 y, using aerosol size spectrometers and in-line holography covering wet particle sizes, that is,

d0

, from 50 nm up to 1 mm. The multimodal fits presented by ref.

5

provide an average estimation of

for an adult (gender plays no role). The smallest particle size considered for infection risk analyses, that is,

, is 0.2

m, which is about 2 times the size of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g., see refs.

3

and

4

). As for the upper limit, we considered

and assumed larger particles deposit to the ground very quickly and in the vicinity of the infectious person. However, it should be noted that there is an ongoing debate regarding the advection distance of exhaled particles in different respiratory activities and room conditions (e.g., see refs.

9

and

29

, and references therein, for more details). Particles exhaled by the infectious are moist and, depending on the RH, may decrease considerably in size by evaporation until they reach the breathing zone of the susceptible. Unless otherwise stated, we have assumed all the particles shrink by a factor of 4, that is,

w

= 4.0, which is the expected shrinkage factor for RH

(

5

), which is a conservative estimate for RH encountered in typical indoor environments (

4

). The values published in table 15 of ref.

53

are used to calculate

and

. However, since these rates are given for general physical activities, that is, sleeping, sitting, and light and heavy exercise, they are combined by optimal weighting factors that were found iteratively and that reproduced the rates found in the literature for different respiratory activities (

77

79

). Breathing and speaking ventilation rates assumed to be constant and equal to 0.57 m

3

×h

−1

and 0.67 m

3

×h

−1

, respectively. While

Pex

and

Lex

are functions of particles diameter during exhalation,

d0

,

Pin

, and

Lin

are dependent on particle diameter during inhalation,

. The penetration of mask fabric is also a function of breathing rates since it will influence the particle loss due to inertial impaction (important for larger than 1-

m particles) and the time required for capturing submicron particles due to Brownian diffusion. The penetration due to mask leakage is also a function of particle diameter and breathing rate; more details regarding these parameters can be found in

Mask Efficacy Measurements

. The ICRP respiratory tract deposition (ICRP94) model (

53

) is used to calculate

, The ICRP94 model can provide an estimate of particle inhalability and also the deposition efficiency in five different regions of the respiratory tract based on empirical and numerical models, namely, nasal, oral, thoracic bronchial, bronchioles, and alveolar regions. In order to capture the deposition of exhaled particles that have dried in the typically subsaturated air of a room, one also needs to consider that such particles will undergo hygroscopic growth as they enter the almost saturated environment within the respiratory tract, that is, with an RH of 99.5% (

4

,

53

,

80

,

81

). To take into account the hygroscopic growth of inhaled particles, the coupled equations describing rate of change in the particle size and its temperature are solved simultaneously, as explained well in section 13.2.1 of ref.

82

, assuming fully dried particles consisting of pure NaCl crystals. This assumption is a good approximation for human aerosols, although a more detailed knowledge would be highly beneficial. The osmotic coefficient required for hygroscopic growth of the NaCl solution is calculated via formulations provided by ref.

83

. The hygroscopic growth codes are verified against diffusional growth rate curves shown in figure 13.2 of ref.

82

and also those produced by the E-AIM web-app (

84

). For all regions, the midresidence time in the region plus the time spent in all the previous regions is taken as the time duration for calculating the grown size of particles. The total time duration that the particles spend in the respiratory tract per each inhalation+exhalation maneuver is calculated as

, where

fR

is the respiration frequency per minute provided by the ICRP94 model. The time that particles spend in each region is then calculated by the distribution of the total respiration time according to the time constants provided by the ICRP94 deposition model for thoracic bronchial, bronchioles, and alveolar regions. The particle residence times for the extrathoracic regions, which are not provided in the ICRP94 model, during inhalation or exhalation are assumed to be 0.1 s. The susceptible is assumed to be a 35-y-old nose-breather male. As mentioned above, the fractional ratio

is one of the most challenging parameters in

Eq. 3

. Even the most detailed simulations to date are carried out by assuming the exhale flow behaves similarly to a turbulent jet in a room with quiescent air (e.g., see refs.

9

and

29

, and references therein). Therefore, for situations where the infectious is not wearing a face mask, we use a simplified theoretical formulation recently proposed for particle-laden jet flows (

26

,

27

), that is,

, where

x

is the distance between the source and the receptor,

a

is the radius of the mouth (assuming a circular shape), and

α

is the exhale jet half-angle. For

1 m,

1.2 cm, and

10

,

fd

is ∼6.8%, which agrees well with the 4.9% experimentally measured for 0.77-

m particles by ref.

85

. For nose breathing, ref.

79

found an average nose opening area of 0.56 cm

2

to 0.71 cm

2

(a = 0.42 cm to 0.48 cm) and

11.5

, where

2 to 3% at a distance of 1 m. For mouth breathing, ref.

79

found

0.61 cm to 0.75 cm and

17

, where

at a distance of 1 m. For speaking, ref.

79

found an average mouth opening of 1.8 cm

2

, which corresponds to

0.76 cm; however, no information for

α

is presented. In order to be on the conservative side when calculating infection risk, we assume

1.8 cm and

10

to achieve

at a distance of 1 m. These values are used for all scenarios in which the infectious is not wearing a face mask, to calculate

fd

. For scenarios in which the infectious is wearing a face mask,

fd

  =  1.

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